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  Having soberly reflected upon the tragedy of September 11, the author 
observed that though International law and treaties restrict pre-emptive war, they 
do allow for war in self-defense. Consequently, some powerful nations have used 
this as a justification for launching pre-emptive strikes. The threats posed by the 
powerful nations using self-defense as a justification for pre-emptive strikes and the 
inability of weaker states to do the same, greatly account for the unprecedented 
explosion of global terrorism. The author thinks that confronting terrorism 
therefore requires a pro-pacifist ethical framework whose principles have to be 
applied with international law to narrow the legitimacy of self-defense wars. Hence 
he proposes ‘Moral Consistency’ as a required condition for launching pre-emptive 
strikes with two main aims— to reduce violent conflicts and to draw a substantial 
distinction between reason and justification, and between crime and criminal 
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 CHAPTER ONE: BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY 
The UN has intensified its peacekeeping measures for decades now. However, in 
spite of its disarmament actions and the number of international treaties and peace 
agreements signed by nations, violent armed conflicts, insurrections and terrorist 
activities continue to occur in many parts of the world. The root cause of such an 
unprecedented explosion of violent conflicts is not easy to explain. One possibility 
is that the proliferation of diverse justificatory theories of the use of force in conflict 
resolution and the disregard for pacifism in particular, have contributed to both the 
terrorism perpetrated by Islamic militant groups and the violent response to such 
terrorism. However, explaining terrorism is initially difficult because the term has 
been used in many ways by many scholars. In this paper, the term implies a 
deliberate and unethical attack by an enemy involving mass killings of civilian 
populations, which causes fear and panic on a people with the aim of achieving 
ideological goals- whether political, religious, economic or social. Obviously, it is 
important for state authorities to prevent its occurrence. It would thereby seem that 
pre-emptive action to avoid terrorist attacks would also be important. But can 
preemptive strikes of this sort be morally justified? This is the central question 
addressed in this paper. 
 There are several different responses that can be expected in answer to the 
question of whether a moral justification of pre-emptive strikes is possible. These 
range from the negative answer of pacifists to the positive answer of those who 
accept a Just War Theory. Some versions of pacifism reject any kind of violence in 
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conflict resolution so preemptive strikes against terrorism are completely rejected. 
By contrast, Just War thinkers believe that there are certain conditions that may 
justify the use of force and so pre-emptive strikes against terrorism may well be 
legitimate. But there is yet another version of pacifism—Just War Pacifism— 
which raises moral concerns about the Just war theory in its application. This paper 
defends the position of the latter version of pacifism to examine the moral 
justification of pre-emptive strikes against terrorism.  
The justification of responding to terror does not necessarily depend on 
which method we use—be it violence or non-violence. Circumstances may 
determine which method but the greatest determinant of justification will also have 
to take the ethics of war and international law on self-defense and aggression into 
consideration. In most cases both the terrorist groups and the self-defendant states1 
may want to prove that they have some rational theories supporting their actions. 
But it appears that some common characteristic features such as abuse of human 
rights, violations against international law and treaties and excessive use of force, 
which are inconsistent with the UN Charter characterize both the acts of terrorism 
and pre-emption against terror. Hence, this thesis critically examines both 
phenomena—terrorist activities and the “war against terror” and proposes a pro-
pacifist response (Just War Pacifist Approach) to minimize the rate of violence in 
confronting terrorism.  
                                                 
1Unless otherwise stated self-defendant should be referred to the USA, the proponent of the “war on 
terror”.  I will also be using the term “Arab world” and Islamic militant groups to describe those on 
the other side of the conflict.  And by the collective term Arab world, I do not speak of the Arabs in 
general. I am referring only to those who are hostile to the U.S. policies and Western culture. I 
include also those Arab countries which are alleged to have been supportive to terrorism. 
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 By proposing a pro-pacifist response in control of terrorism, I am not in any 
way attempting to encourage the degree of violence perpetrated by terrorist groups. 
I deliberately omitted the task of aiming to minimize international violence by first 
exploring terrorism; for terrorist activities can hardly be non-violent since terrorism 
and violence are inextricably intertwined. It will not make any sense and it is even 
impossible to conceptualize a non-violent terrorism. Alternatively, international 
violence can be suppressed by targeting the other side of the conflict (prevention 
against terror) since the degree of force employed as a pre-emptive strategy may be 
regulated to certain limits by considering some versions of pacifism. It is obvious 
that when the excessive violence by self-defendant states is brought to a minimal 
level then international terrorism can also be reduced, for the later seems to be a 
direct response to the former. 
But to what extent could a pro-pacifist approach to terrorism be realistic and 
appealing to the international community in a time when there is great passion for 
military response to conflict resolution? For instance, Paul Christopher (1999), 
Brian Orend (2000), Jean Bethke Elshtain (2003) and many other peace and conflict 
experts have done substantive scholarly work on determining under what 
circumstances the use of force may be justified. I agree with them to some extent, 
but the problem I have with their work is the disrespect they have for pacifism. It is 
one thing to justify the use of force and another thing to condemn pacifism. A sober 
analysis of pacifism reveals that pacifism and Just War doctrine are not mutually 
exclusive. Ethically, both share some common moral principles. However, in their 
examination of the phenomenon these scholars have leveled sharp criticisms at 
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pacifism in a bid to glorify Just War Theory. In the midst of such theories it will be 
difficult to recommend a pro-pacifist response in confronting terrorism. So to 
present my views about how terrorism should be handled I am also faced with the 
challenge of presenting some moral principles which are embedded in the Just War 
Pacifist doctrine. This commitment divides my thesis into two main sections—
theory and application.  
Even though the thesis does not openly present such design it is important 
for the reader to recognize that the first part of the essay lays the foundation of the 
thesis by focusing on a careful examination of the established theories in ethics of 
war and violence, notably, Pacifism and the Just War doctrine. In defense of 
pacifism, I discuss contemporary Just War Theory and examine its application to 
find out whether it is possible to meet all the requirements of the theory in a given 
war situation. As part of the defense of pacifism, I also offer critical evaluation of 
the Just War Theory. It is apparent that there are problems when the Just War 
Theory is applied. This explains why it is possible for a purportedly Just War to 
begin and end unjustly. Some contemporary Just War thinkers interpret the last 
resort criterion as a resort to force just after a deliberation (Elshtain 2003), thus 
making it possible for powerful states to declare war as a necessity at any time 
(even when there seem to be alternatives). Consequently, the purpose of reducing 
the occurrence of extreme and unethical use of force by modern states is 
consciously and sometimes unconsciously being pushed to the background. One 
may argue that a theory need not rule out misinterpretation and abuse of it but I 
think a critical examination of this theory is important because it determines life 
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and death of innocent human beings. Apart from the possibilities of abusing and 
manipulating the Just War principles for one’s own interest, the theory does not 
speak to how weaker states can make legitimate use of force when the need arises. 
This is perhaps one of the causes of contemporary terrorism which has not yet been 
observed by most people.  For instance, the Just War Theory does not tell us when 
and how a weak nation should launch pre-emptive strikes against a powerful nation. 
Even though Just War Theory and international conventions permit states to wage 
defensive wars against aggression under certain circumstances, the unprecedented 
explosion of international terrorist acts in response to an excessive use of violence 
by some powerful states suggests the insufficiency of appealing to such conventions 
for peace and justice.  
The explanation of the constant struggle, vengeance, and retaliatory terror in 
international politics is not far fetched. While powerful states make use of the 
principles of Just War in self-defense they do not seem to make an objective 
reflection on the history of the conflict between them and their enemies though that 
is very important in issues of peace and justice. In his remarks about the U.S.’s 
response to the September 11 attacks, As’ ad Abukhalil offers a brief history, with 
comments, about what the world thinks of Bin Laden. He ties the problem to the 
Israeli–Palestinian conflict, and highlights the atrocities committed by the U.S. on 
the Arab world. Abukhalil says that: 
 
           …I have been quite unhappy with the quality of books on the crisis [September 
              11] and on Bin Laden… I grew up in Lebanon and came to this country [U.S.]  
              as a graduate student. I lived not far from Palestinian refugee camps. I have seen 
               the devastation and human suffering caused by American weapons in Israeli  
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               hands, and also U.S. forces in Lebanon in the 1980s. …I lived through the Israeli 
               invasion of Lebanon in 1982, which resulted in the death of more than 15,000 
               Palestinians and Lebanese, mostly civilians. U.S. media barely, if ever, reported 
               those deaths to Americans, while Israeli loss was mourned. The story that is  
               told is not a pleasant one. It entails murder, deception, duplicity, crude and subtle 
               propaganda, war, defeat, racism, humiliation, oppression, misery, bigotry, and   
               international domination and subjugation. …It is the story of U.S. roles around the 
                world, a story with which a majority of Americans are unfamiliar.2
 
Given this feeling of animosity a military response to terrorism will be adding more 
insult to injury. In such circumstances the problem cannot be solved by appealing to 
the Just War principles, since this is not the purpose for which the Just War doctrine 
was evolved. In most cases, the architects of the original Just War Theory were not 
guilty of the evils they sought to address. As will be shown later, a careful study of 
the practice of Just War in Ancient Rome in contrast with contemporary 
interpretations of the theory reveals that there is an apparent missing ingredient in 
how it is practiced today. Thus, while initiators of war traditionally were genuinely 
committed to restoring justice, contemporary Just War proponents fall short of this 
significant feature in their application of Just War Theory. These days, state 
officials do not normally engage in self-evaluation before invoking self-defense. 
Without such evaluations one is tempted to assume that the reasonable chance of 
success in pre-emptive self-defense wars against one’s enemy is enough principle 
for justification. But because human beings are prone to retaliation and vengeance 
when attacked it is unlikely that any such self-defense wars can ensure peace. 
                                                 
2  Abukhalil, A. (2002) Bin Laden, Islam and America’s New “War on Terrorism”. Seven Stories 
Press, New York. pp. 10-12 
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The second part of the thesis also adopts the Just War Pacifist ideology to 
evaluate America’s response to terrorism. Here, due to the significance of history 
surrounding each case of conflict I argue that a state’s right of pre-emptive self-
defense is largely determined by her moral relationship with her enemy.  Hence the 
only legitimate self-defense against terrorism that may possibly ensure peace and 
justice is the one evoked by the self-defendant with clean hands3. 
Therefore, to succeed in minimizing violent conflicts involving terrorist acts 
in our world, I think there is a need to set a moral requirement for pre-emptive self-
defense attacks in order to curtail the bullying of world superpowers against weak 
states, and at the same time to ensure that the weaker nations be assisted in seeking 
redress for the deprivation of their social, economic and political rights when the 
need arises. However, due to constraints on time and space this study will seek to 
address only one aspect of the problem – how modern states can be restricted from 
launching unproductive and unethical pre-emptive wars against other states 
suspected of being associated with terrorist groups in order to minimize terror and 
counter-terror.  
Thus in this study, a pro-pacifist conceptual framework is proposed to deal 
with the problem. The next chapter, Chapter Two, briefly examines various forms 
of pacifism and the principles of Just War theory as the theoretical framework of 
the thesis. It considers the circumstances under which force may be justified by the 
Just War theory and presents the Just War Pacifist argument to critique the theory. 
Also, Chapter Two briefly discusses how the inherent problems associated with the 
                                                 
3 Under this context, what I mean by clean hands is where a state, groups of people, or individuals 
are innocent and blameless in their relationship with the enemy prior to the offender’s attack.  
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Just War doctrine makes the contemporary Just War theorists’ argument no 
different than some versions of pacifism— Just War Pacifism. This is an attempt to 
reconcile pacifism with the Just War doctrine for peace and justice. Since pacifism 
does not seem to appeal to contemporary Just War theorists in conflict resolution, 
Chapter Three critically examines the various explanations which such scholars 
offer for the justification of pre-emptive strikes. While one may consider such 
explanations as reasons, the discussion proceeds, in Chapter Four to pay particular 
attention to the legal justification of pre-emptive wars against terrorism. Following 
the challenges posed by the significance of self-defense in an age of terror, the last 
chapter focuses on the Just War Pacifist view and recommends moral consistency 
as a prerequisite condition for states which adopt Just War theory and international 
law as models to justify pre-emptive strikes against terrorism.  
 
Moral consistency is not a substitute for International Law and the Just War 
Theory but a complement to it. It calls for the fulfillment of some moral principles 
without which peace and justice can hardly be achieved even when modern states 
apply the Just War doctrine for the justification of pre-emption against terrorism. In 
this context, country/party A will be deemed to be morally justified in waging war 
on or attacking country/party B only when country/party A has ‘clean hands’. That 
is, just in case (among other conditions) country/party A has not previously been 
guilty of any persistent harm or unfair treatment to country/party B. More 
importantly, the moral consistency requirement has the prospect of minimizing the 
use of force and reducing terror and counter-terror. This idea is captured by the 
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remark by Fred Charles Ikle: “The battles fought during a war, of course, contribute 
to its aftermath; but it is the way in which a war is brought to an end that has most 
decisive long-term impact”4. We may fight to protect and preserve the interests of 




















                                                 
4 Ikle, Fred Charles. (1991) Every War Must End. Columbia University Press. p. vii 
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CHAPTER TWO: PACIFISM AND THE JUST WAR DOCTRINE 
 
2.0: Introduction.  
Theories about the justification of war were developed as a result of various 
conceptions of war and peace which have both religious and secular foundations. 
This chapter highlights the main ideas of the principles of the Just War Theory and 
examines the dilemmas it poses in its attempt to specify conditions that could 
justify engaging in warfare. This would include such acts of war as pre-emptive 
strikes against terrorist groups. In doing this, I first explore different attitudes to war 
and briefly examine different types of pacifism. The reason for doing this is that 
while some contemporary philosophers and political writers reject pacifist thinking 
but tend to defend the Just War Theory, I argue that even though there are inherent 
problems with the Just War theory we need to acknowledge that it originates from 
pacifist thinking. Therefore, those who support Just War doctrine should not 
overlook the moral principles, like rights and duties, underlying pacifism (at least 
some versions of it).     
 
2.1: Perceptions About War  
The idea of conceiving war as an absence of peace has brought philosophers, 
political theorists and theologians into two main groups – the realists or 
conservatives and idealists otherwise known as abolitionists. While the 
conservative theorists perceive war in human existence as unavoidable, the 
abolitionists rather think that even though war is a human cultural phenomenon it 
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can be controlled or avoided by positive institutional readjustments and conscious 
efforts to work for peace. Modern day political thinkers have taken both of these 
two positions. For instance, Brian Orend, a realist, has remarked that “The brutal 
truth is that there is no imminent solution to the problem of war: wars are being 
fought and will continue to be fought for some time”5 Similarly, Paul Christopher 
shares the same idea in his observation that “conflicts are ongoing at various places 
around the world, and it is highly unlikely that this will change anytime soon”6    
Even though the notion of war’s inevitability has the power of influencing 
one’s moral sensibility and judgments about the ethics of war, we will not bother 
ourselves so much with that now. This is because understanding war as part of 
human existence is one thing but whether states have any right to use force against 
other autonomous states or to engage them in warfare is another thing altogether. 
As far as this study is concerned I will focus on the issue of whether it is ever 
justified for states to use force in protecting its citizens and allies.  In doing this, let 
us first briefly take an overview of the basis and sources of traditional doctrines that 
have been developed to oppose war. 
 
2.2:  Pacifism 
According to Jenny Teichman the word ‘pacifism’ first appeared in 1902 
and it was coined by a Frenchman who attended an international peace congress. He 
                                                 
5 Orend, B., War and International Justice: A Kantian Perspective. (Wilfrid Laurier University 
Press. Waterloo, Canada, 2000), 10. 
6 Christopher, P.  The Ethics of War and Peace. 2nd edition. (Prentice Hall, Upper Saddle River, New 
Jersey, U.S.A. 1999), 3. 
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used the term to refer to anti-warism.7 The word has since been used by several 
other scholars to describe people who express hostile attitudes towards war. 
However, over the years different versions of pacifist thinking have evolved, 
thereby making it possible to encounter a pacifist who admits that force can be used 
in exceptional cases to ensure justice. But because pacifism is usually associated 
with religious people and more specifically, the early Christians in the then Roman 
empire whose deep love for peace prompted stiff opposition to war and all forms of 
violence, the term seems to have been misconstrued by some writers.   
Many early Christians interpreted some of the New Testament doctrines as 
prohibitions against war and violence – for instance, ‘turn the other cheek’, ‘love 
your enemies’, ‘blessed are the peacemakers’ etc 8.  Not only did many early 
Christians express opposition to war and violence, they questioned whether one 
could join the military and still remain a Christian. This was a perplexing issue for 
most of the Christians under the Roman Empire. However, Christian pacifist 
thinking was challenged on several grounds by theologians such as Saint Ambrose, 
Saint Augustine, and Thomas Aquinas. Paul Christopher cites many examples from 
the writings of these eminent theologians and points out the problems with the 
interpretations of the New Testament by some Christians. For Christopher, it does 
not seem as though the New Testament contains only references that prohibit 
violence and war. One of the challenging references he cites from the Bible is this:  
    Let every soul be subject unto the higher powers. For there is no power but of 
   God: the powers that be are ordained of God. Whosoever therefore resisteth the 
    power, resisteth the ordinance of God: and they that resist shall receive to the- 
    mselves damnation. For rulers are not a terror to good works, but to the evil.  
                                                 
7 Teichman, J. Pacifism and the Just War. (1986 ) p.1 
8 These are normally referred to as ‘The Sermon on the Mount’ in theology. They can be found in 
Matthew and the other gospels of the Christian Bible i.e. Greek Scriptures. 
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   Wilt thou not be afraid of the power? Do that which is good, and thou shalt have  
    praise of the same: For he is the minister of God to thee for good. But if thou do  
    that which is evil, be afraid; for he beareth not the sword in vain: for he is the  
    minister of God, a revenger to execute wrath upon him that doeth evil. 9
 
Paul Christopher argues that for the purposes of communal order and 
distributive justice, this passage clearly permits authorities to use violence. Also, 
with the general notion that the Old Testament seems to command war and violence 
he further underlines this as another problem for the pacifist.  For Christopher, 
 
          ..it requires that one accept both Old Testament and New Testament as  
          presenting different moral standards. Without this discontinuity it is  
          impossible to reconcile pacifism with lex talionis (Exd.21-24). If, how- 
          ever, the violence of the Old Testament is understood as a legitimate means  
          of retributive justice rather than as a form of revenge, the two texts are not 
           incommensurate.10
 
One cannot dispute the fact that there are apparent and notable discrepancies 
between the Old Testament and the New Testament which still appear irresolvable 
dilemmas in Christian theology. Paul Christopher’s attempt to evaluate the two 
testaments to justify the use of force might seem relevant but that does not provide 
us with the entire definition of the pacifist ideology. In other words, the traditional 
Christian opposition to war does not entail that pacifism implies an absolute 
opposition to war and violence, for it is just one version of pacifism. It cannot be 
used to explain and to condemn the whole pacifist doctrine. This is not the only 
place where Christopher commits such an error. He caricatures pacifism by 
assuming that it will be inconsistent for the pacifist to endorse some degree of force 
to dispense justice. In his own words he emphasizes that:  
         For pacifism to qualify as a moral doctrine, however, it must be formulated so  
         that there is never a justification for the use of violence. This does not seem  
                                                 
9 Romans 12:1-4, King James Version. 
10 Christopher, P. (1999) Ethics of War and Peace pp. 20-21 
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         plausible to me from either a theoretical standpoint or as a practical guide.11
 
 
A similar comment is made by Jean Bethke Elshtain in her recent book, Just War 
Against Terror. Elshtain writes: 
       Pacifists condemn any resort to force outright, whether administered by  
       a musket or a nuclear bomb, so debating justification for a resort to force 
       is moot.12
  
It takes the recognition of various kinds of pacifism before one can respond 
to the objection raised by Christopher and those who share a similar view. His 
supposition that the pacifist should either not sanction war or should completely 
endorse it can best be described as an argument that is guilty of false dichotomy. It 
fails to realize that it is always possible for one to escape the two extreme positions 
and still retain one’s pacifist ideology. Neither can we accept Elshtain’s definition 
of pacifism since it also suggests that pacifism does not permit any kind of force at 
all. I think pacifism is more than what they offer here. A more acceptable definition 
for general pacifist thinking is required. Brian Orend draws us close to what 
pacifism is all about:  
                  Literally and straightforwardly, a pacifist rejects war in favour of peace. It is not  
violence in all its forms that the most challenging kind of pacifist objects to;  
rather, it is the specific kind and degree of violence that war involves which the 
pacifist objects to. A pacifist objects to killing (not just violence) in general and, 
in particular, she objects to the mass killing, for political reasons, which is part  
and parcel of wartime experience.13
 
I think Orend’s definition seems to capture some of the main conceptions of 
pacifism, especially the passion and strong enthusiasm for peace rather than war 
                                                 
11 Ibid, p.3 
12 Elshtain, J.B. (2003) Just War Against Terror: The Burden of American Power in a Violent World. 
Basic Books.p.63 
13 Brian Orend, ‘Evaluating Pacifism’ In Canadian Philosophical Review. VOL. XL, NO.1 Winter 
2001 p.4. 
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and the rejection of unwarranted violence that may result in mass killing.  
Nonetheless, I think Orend’s remark about pacifism also needs to be critically 
examined. After providing what appears to be a reasonable definition of pacifism, 
Orend further infers: “So, a pacifist rejects war; she believes that there are no moral 
grounds which can justify resorting to war. War for the pacifist, is always wrong” 14
Since there are various kinds of pacifism some of which in the course of 
justice may sometimes accept a considerable amount of war and violence, Orend’s 
later comment makes his definition too narrow. It cannot be said that pacifists 
(those who oppose war outright) do not have any moral grounds for their position. 
Most pacifists do not reject war for no reason. There are various reasons which 
underline such pacifist thinking, and which I think cannot be overlooked. We can 
understand some of these reasons by exploring Teichman’s treatment of various 
kinds of pacifism.  
Though Teichman herself claims pacifism connotes rejection of war she 
admits that there are various moral principles (some of which are based on human 
rights), which explain why it is wrong to shed blood or to be engaged in warfare.15 
In expounding some of the moral reasons for the pacifist’s opposition to war and 
violence, Teichman categorizes pacifism into two main groups- conditional and 
unconditional pacifism. Whilst the conditional pacifists’ acceptance of war depends 
largely on the conditions under which war is fought, the latter opposes war outright. 
Perhaps the classical example of unconditional pacifism is Mohandas K. Gandhi’s 
                                                 
14 Ibid. 
15Jenny Teichman.  Pacifism and the Just War. (1986) p.4f 
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non-violent resistance approach to dispute resolution16, which John Yoder describes 
in his Nevertheless (1971) as ‘Absolute Pacifism’.17 One version of conditional 
pacifism identified by Teichman is the belief that war is permitted by the Old 
Testament but it is forbidden by Jesus’ teachings under the New Testament 
dispensation. This implies that because Christ introduced nonviolent response to 
one’s enemy in the New Testament dispensation it would be morally inconsistent 
for one to follow Christ’s moral teachings and engage in war, retaliation, and all 
forms of violence.  Another type of Teichman’s conditional pacifism will accept 
warfare only if the destructive weapons were used to kill combatants, and if soldiers 
were to kill each other without taking the lives of large numbers of civilians. 
                                                 
16 Gandhi (1869-1948) is an eminent non-violent activist who employed Asiatic religious thought to 
resist British imperial rule in India during the 20th century. For more information on his approach see 
the BBC Website on Ethics of War.   
17 Teichman reviews John Yoder’s discussion of diverse kinds of pacifism one of which is Absolute 
pacifism. See this in Teichman, J. (1986) Pacifism and the Just War. pp7-9. Aside from this she also 
cites various types of pacifism from the work of Peter Brock [Pacifism in Europe to 1914, (Princeton 
1972)]. Brock’s types of pacifism recorded by Teichman include the following: 
“Vocational pacifism is the pacifism of priests and others in holy orders. It can (though it need not) 
go with anti-warism or with theories about non-violence. 
Eschatological pacifism is an interim ethic which teaches that there will be an Apocalyptic war at 
the last day between the forces of good and evil, but until then wars are to be utterly rejected. Merely 
human wars, that is, are forbidden, and human beings will only be indirectly involved in the war of 
the Day of God’s Wrath. 
Separational pacifism is the view that the redeemed or favoured of God must separate themselves 
from the rest of mankind. Ordinary human society is irredeemably wicked and worldly so whoever 
wants to be saved must abandon it. The New Testament is taken as the Law, replacing the teaching 
of the Old Testament. War is condemned absolutely, but ‘the violence of the magistrate’ is accepted 
as conditionally justified; even that violence, however, is regarded as belonging in its essence to the 
realm of evil. 
Integrational pacifism is the title given by Brock to those pacifist groups which combine an ethic of 
peace and peace-seeking with the setting up of reform movements whose platforms include 
opposition to war but may contain other aims as well, e.g. the abolition of racial segregation. 
Integrational pacifists do not reject government nor the use of force by government; they reject only 
the injurious use of external force in international relations. Modern Quakerism, in Brock’s view, is 
an example of an integrational pacifist movement. 
Goal-directed pacifism involves the use of non-violent techniques in order to achieve specific aims. 
Ghandi’s fasting while in goal is an example. Bertrand Russell’s ‘Direct Action’, associated with his 
membership of “the Committee of 100’ in the 1950s, is another, the action in question being non-
violent, e.g., sitting down in front of buildings inhabited by the Ministry of Defence. No doubt the 
Greenham Common Women are involved in goal-directed pacifism by this definition.” See 
Teichman, J. (1986) Pacifism and the Just War. pp.6-7. 
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Besides, some pacifists explain their negative attitudes towards war in terms of how 
soldiers are recruited to engage in warfare. They argue that it would not pose any 
moral dilemma if people who engage in war were all volunteers. In other words, 
such pacifists think that it is morally wrong to conscript all or many people into 
fighting. 
Teichman refers to these last two versions of conditional pacifism as just 
war pacifism, for the reason that “they exemplify the idea that war, or most war, or 
modern war, because of its very nature, cannot possibly fulfill those canons of 
justice which were supposed to make the activity all right.”18 This is the thrust of 
the argument by the reasonable pacifists. The truth of the matter is that some 
pacifists completely reject war of all kinds; others have moral reasons for not 
endorsing war and do not want to violate their moral obligations. The latter are 
inclined towards peacemaking and peace building; they have respect for human life 
and would not reject war if the just war principles were sincerely and objectively 
employed when the need arises. That is, if those conditions were satisfied, war can 
justifiably be resorted to. 
Our evaluation of the various kinds of pacifism should not be based on the 
underlying assumptions of each of these beliefs, for they all promote peace and 
social co-operation. The objection that can be raised is the level at which such 
beliefs can be entertained. While absolute pacifism may be encouraged at the 
individual and personal levels the same cannot be said when one occupies a 
political position, for the latter domain comes with greater responsibility and more 
enduring consequences for inaction when the use of force really remains the only 
                                                 
18Teichman, J. Pacifism and the Just War. (1986) p 5 
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option. So on balance, due to the above reasons conditional pacifism, especially, 
just war pacifism, seems to have the potential of ensuring international peace and 
justice better than the unconditional one. But that should not foster the idea that 
pacifism does not have any moral conception for the justification of war as Brian 
Orend and Paul Christopher may want to prove. The conditions for the justification 
of pre-emptive strikes against terrorism under “Moral Consistency” in Chapter Five 
highlight the degree of force which can be accepted by the pacifist. For now let us 
briefly examine the Just War theory. 
 
2.3: The Just War Doctrine 
The adjective just qualifying the noun war creates two impressions; that 
some wars are just, and that others are unjust. It also presupposes that there is a 
connection between justice and war. That is, the idea is that occasionally war can be 
resorted to for the restoration of peace and justice. The just war doctrine, over the 
years, has been developed by Christian theologians, philosophers, jurists and many 
others to answer the question of who may declare war, when and how.  The 
justification is usually based on either theory or precedent. While the theory aspect 
deals with the legitimacy of resorting to war as a means of resolving conflicts, the 
precedent one acknowledges certain forms of treaties, regulations, and agreements 
that have evolved throughout history among nations probably as a result of 
engaging in warfare. The United Nations’ resolutions and international conventions 
and declarations such as the Geneva and Hague conventions are examples of 
historical rules proposed to restrain some forms of war and violence.  There are two 
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facets of Just War theory expressed in Latin as the Jus ad bellum, which spells out 
the conditions under which engaging in war may be legitimate, and Jus in bello, 
which is about how a war should be conducted once it gets started. Two things need 
to be noted here. First, classical versions of the Just War theory do not seem to have 
the divisions of Jus ad bellum and Jus in bello. Second, the principles under the jus 
ad bellum convention also vary according to each theorist.  For instance, Thomas 
Aquinas’ version of the Just War doctrine identifies three main conditions i.e. right 
authority, sufficient cause, and right intention.19 We will, however, examine the 
theory as analyzed by contemporary writers.   
 
2.3.1: The Jus Ad Bellum 
According to experts, the required principles under the jus ad bellum include 
the following: for a war to be just:  
It must be declared by the right authority, 
It must have been initiated for a just cause, 
It must be the last resort, 
It must be fought with the right intention, 
There must be a reasonable chance of success, 
The means employed in the war should correspond to the ends it aims to achieve.20 
Lastly, the Encyclopedia of Political Thought further requires that a just war should 
                                                 
19 Tooke, Joan D. (1965) The Just War in Aquinas & Grotius. S.P.C.K, London. p. 21 
20 These criteria are severally discussed by Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars. Third edition.  
(Basic Books, 2000); Joan D. Tooke, The Just War in Aquinas & Grotius. (London: S.P.C.K., 1965) 
; Jenny Teichman, Pacifism and the Just war. (Basil Blackwell:1986) 
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aim at peace as its goal.21 Unfortunately, contemporary just war experts do not 
seem to pay attention to this criterion. We will understand how the neglect of this 
condition has contributed to terror and counter-terror as we examine the bases of 
modern states’ resort to force in chapters four and five. Let us now examine the 
content of the conditions. 
 
Right Authority 
Scholars have interpreted right authority in Just War doctrine as a 
recognized or legal institution of a state, which is considered as having the right to 
declare war within its jurisdiction. Depending on the system of government 
practiced by a given state lawful authority may be a king, head of state, a president 
or a prime minister. He or she wields political power and has the sole power to 
declare a war. 
 
Just Cause 
 This principle explains the reason(s) for going to war. Should a country 
resort to war because it has the ability and military superiority to win? Must a state 
fight another country because the latter resists adopting the former’s political and 
economic ideologies? May we describe it as a just cause if country A attacks 
country B when country A feels insecure under the growing influence of country B?  
Causes or reasons for going to war are many so this principle primarily must tell us 
those that should be included under the Just War theory. In her analysis of various 
sources of just cause from Augustine, Aquinas and conventions like the decrees of 
                                                 
21 David Miller (ed.) The Encyclopedia of Political Thought, The Blackwell. 
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Popes and other medieval commentators, Teichman (1986) points out that “The 
traditional reasons [for going to war] include self-defence, the defence of the 
homeland, the defence of allies, the bringing about of a return to the status quo after 
theft of goods or expropriation of territory, the punishment of guilty persons22…and 
the coercion of wrong-thinking people.”23  The BBC home page on the ethics of 
war has several examples of self-defense which may be deemed as reasons for 
recourse to war – invasion, attack on state religion, economic attack, pre-emptive 
strike, attack on national honor, and assassination of a prominent national figure of 
a country. But while an invasion, i.e., the actual aggression of an enemy constitutes 
a sufficient just cause of war, all the rest are considered as ‘less obvious causes for 
war’.24 If self-defense is a just cause for recourse to war why isn’t preventive self-
defense such as a pre-emptive strike also a just cause? In other words, whereas 
traditional self-defense in criminal law allows a person to take the life of another 
when one is threatened by death or bodily harm,25 it appears quite unclear why pre-
emptive strikes are cut off from the list of just causes as far as the traditional model 




                                                 
22 While ‘warmongers’, generals, and criminals are cited by Teichman as examples of guilty persons 
she identifies infidels and heretics as wrong-thinking people.  
23 Teichman, J. Pacifism and the Just War. (1986) p.55. 
24  www.bbc.co.uk/religion/ethics/war/justwarintro.shtml, June 15, 2003 
25 Aurthur Rispstein discusses the boundaries and requirements of self-defense in criminal law in his 
Equality, Responsibility, and the Law. (Cambridge University Press, 1999) 190-200 
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As a traditional Just War principle, “last resort” implies that war should be 
resorted to only after all peaceful means of resolving conflicts have proved 
unsuccessful. Nowhere has this principle been more rightly applied than in ancient 
Rome, as we shall discuss later. Among ancient Roman authorities the offender 
would first be made to seek for peace before considering any other violent option. 
However, contemporary war experts disagree with this understanding of last resort. 
Some for instance, think that the use of force is legitimate immediately ‘after 
deliberations’.26 According to this view, it is the victim state’s deliberation over a 
given situation that will determine whether resort to war is appropriate.  
 
Right Intention  
In just war theory, “right intention” urges that the war is initiated from right 
or pure motive without any special interest or pretense. Joan D. Tooke accounts for 
what Aquinas refers to as good intention: “A good intention, one of securing peace, 
punishing evildoers, and helping the good, is essential for just war”27 The BBC 
Ethics web site also outlines both good and bad intentions. A war waged from good 
intentions include: restoration, keeping a just peace, making wrong things right, and 
defending the innocent. Bad intentions also include: “seeking power, demonstrating 
the power of a state, grabbing land or goods, or enslaving people, hatred of the 
                                                 
26 Elshtain, J.B. (2003) Just War Against Terror: The Burden of American Power in a Violent World. 
Basic Books.p.65 
 
27 Tooke, Joan D. (1965) The Just War in Aquinas & Grotius. S.P.C.K, London. p.23 
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enemy, genocide, personal or national glory, revenge, and preserving colonial 
power”28   
 
Chance of Success 
Why should a just war have “success” as one of its criteria? A 
consequentialist response to this is that war is inherently evil. It claims human life 
and destroys other precious resources and properties, and therefore, if there is no 
hope of success then it would be ethically wrong for states to undertake the risk of 
going to war. Perhaps this explains why independent sovereign states sometimes 
pool their resources to fight a common enemy whose military strength could not 
have been defeated by only one state. A more refined interpretation by experts also 
suggests the need to conceptualize what is success, and to calculate the possibility 
of achieving the goals of the war beforehand. By this, one may hope to have a 
reasonable chance of success if one declares war.   
 
Proportionality 
When a state identifies a just cause after deliberations over other options for 
conflict resolution, the right authority of that state under the Just War theory may 
declare a war with good intention to put things right. But it is not enough unless the 
means by which it seeks to address the problem is proportional to the harms 
suffered. This criterion does not differ from the proportionality principle in jus in 
bello.   
 
                                                 
28 www.bbc.co.uk/religion/ethics/war/justwarintro.shtml, June 15, 2003. 
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2.3.2: The Jus In Bello Convention 
The core requirements of Jus in Bello are proportionality and 
discrimination. To ensure just conduct in war, “proportionality” highlights how the 
means in war can be matched with its ends. It urges that the degree of force 
employed in a war must be proportional to the nature of the threat posed. On the 
other hand, “discrimination” concerns who is to be targeted in times of war. It 
emphasizes the need to draw a distinction between combatants and noncombatants 
in warfare. Historically children, the aged or disabled, women, prisoners of war and 
all unarmed civilians are described as noncombatants.29 According to international 
conventions some weapons are not permitted to be used in warfare. The Hague 
Convention of 1907 for instance, forbids the use of poisoned weapons, killing or 
wounding treacherously, maltreating prisoners of war, declaration of no mercy for 
opponents, etc. 30
Thus, roughly, the reasonable pacifist31 will first of all not hasten to resort to 
war as an approach to deal with conflicts but, when circumstances compel her to 
fight for justice because of the offender’s unjustified aggression or attack, she is 
guided by the above principles (the combination of jus ad bello and jus in bello) in 
order to fight justly. It should be noted here that the Just War theory is a set of 
principles, which must be applied together. Violation of one may therefore be seen 
as violation of the whole doctrine. 
 
                                                 
29 Elshtain, J.B. (2003) Just War Against Terror: The Burden of American Power in a Violent World. 
Basic Books.p.65 
30 www.bbc.co.uk/religion/ethics/war/justwarintro.shtml, June 15, 2003 
31 Reasonable pacifist is used interchangeably with conditional pacifist. 
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2.4:  The problems with the application of the Just War doctrine 
 Is it possible to fulfill all the seven requirements in a given war situation? 
Are some of the principles more important than others? Which of the principles 
should hold sway if they conflict with others? The difficulties, contradictions and 
counter-attacks resulting from the application of Just War doctrine to justify the use 
of force underscore how the principles are jointly insufficient. The conflicting 
nature of some of the principles renders the just war theory problematic in its 
application and for that matter, makes the justification of pre-emptive wars difficult 
as well. As a result, it is often said that a war can be just in theory but not in 
practice. In what follows we shall point out the dilemmas with some of the 
principles and examine the complexities involved in an attempt to adopt the Just 
War theory as a model to justify the use of force including pre-emptive war. The 
examination of these puzzles goes a long way towards reaffirming the position of 
the just war pacifists. 
Apparently the existence of two traditional conventions of Just War i.e. just 
ad bellum and jus in bello makes it possible for a just war to begin but to be fought 
unjustly. Thus given a just cause, a competent and recognized authority of a state 
that has military capacity and a reasonable chance of success may declare a war 
with good intention (e.g. to restore peace) after exploring several unsuccessful non-
violent attempts to restore peace. But if in any situation his soldiers fail to comply 
with the code of ethics in war and end up with serious human rights violations the 
war can hardly be a just one. There are records of such misconduct and 
unreasonable brutalities by some military men in intervention wars. For example,  
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    In Somalia soldiers in the intervention force tortured, tormented and murdered  
    innocent children and civilians.  A child in Somalia is reported to have been put  
    in a box, in the blazing sun after he was caught stealing food from the people  
    on Mission and was retrieved dead. The report says photographs have been  
    published showing a soldier applying electrodes to various parts of a naked man  
    In the worst of all, one of the soldiers (whose nationality I will not disclose)  
    was accused of forcing a Somali youth to take in pork and worms, drink 
    salt water and   then eat his own vomit. (Remember most Somalis are Muslims  
    who do not eat pork)32   
 
Intervention to protect the life of innocent civilians is a just cause, but the 
above inhuman acts and misconduct are inconsistent with just war. A similar 
situation whereby unjust means were employed in war with a just cause occurred 
during World War ll. America has been criticized for its use of atomic bombs which 
violated the jus in bello convention because it failed to observe the noncombatant 
immunity principle33. The recent brutalities and sexual misconduct against the 
prisoners of war in Iraq by some American soldiers is also a case in point. These 
scenarios raise the question of when a war could be described as just or unjust- 
should a war be considered as just before it begins or during the conflict  or after its 
end? 
 “Right authority” has generally been agreed by both the traditional and 
contemporary architects of the Just War theory as one of the important pre-requisite 
conditions for just war. According to this principle, a person who wields political 
power but who does not have the right to do so isn’t a legitimate authority to initiate 
war. Hence leaders who impose themselves in power through the gun, especially, in 
some developing countries, and all revolutionaries, are typical examples of 
illegitimate authorities to declare war. According to Teichman if a war is unjust 
                                                 
32 Daniel Oduro Sem “A Philosophical Review of the European Union’s Principles for Conflict 
Prevention in Africa” ( B.A. Long Essay, Philosophy Department, University of Ghana 1999) 47. 
For the original information see the popular Magazine, New Africa, November l997 pp. 18-19.  
33 Elshtain, J.B. Just War Against Terror. (Basic Books, New York, 2003) 62. 
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when it is waged by usurpers then wars initiated by the heirs of the usurpers are 
equally unjust.34 Considering the rampant occurrence of violent revolutions in 
Europe in the 1980s, Teichman doubts that there could really be just wars as far as 
the right authority criterion is concerned. Therefore, she writes: “Either there are 
very few proper authorities and so very few just wars, or else proper authority is 
compatible with usurpation and revolution”35. By so doing Teichman reduces the 
meaning of proper authority to public international recognition. By implication, 
contemporary state officials who occupy political seats as usurpers can be said to be 
potentially illegitimate rulers unless they have international recognition. It follows 
that their interpretation of the Just War doctrine to invoke a pre-emptive strike 
cannot also be justified if it does not have international approval.  
The interpretation of last resort also poses a problem due to a refined 
definition offered by present-day Just War experts.  While the term originally 
implied a resort to force in the absence of alternative solutions to conflict, 
contemporary state officials choose to go for war based on their subjective 
understanding of the term. Now to determine whether deployment of military force 
is the last resort depends on factors such as the degree of the aggression one seeks 
to address, availability of other options, and the level of patience a state may 
entertain with her antagonists. Last resort still remains a model for traditional Just 
War theorists who understood and applied the term in an undiluted manner. Last 
resort appears a relative term since it does not seem to make the use of force the 
last option, indeed, to everyone at all times and in all circumstances. In the 
                                                 
34 Teichman, J. Pacifism and the Just War, (1986) p.55 
35 Ibid. 
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following passage Paul Christopher echoes Arthur Nussbaum (1954) and describes 
how the Just War was practiced in ancient Rome. And I think the passage 
illuminates what “last resort” really meant to ancient Roman generals in their 
application of the doctrine.  
      Rome had a detailed procedure whereby whenever she had a grievance against 
      another city, ambassadors under the direction of a distinguished statesman would  
      go to the offering city and demand reparations. The ambassadors then returned  
      to Rome and waited thirty-three days for a response. If they receive none, the 
      same representative and his party would again travel to the nation and threaten  
      war. If the offending nation still refused, the designated statesman would info- 
      rm the Roman senate of the failure to achieve reparations, and the Senate cou- 
      ld decide to resort to force to carry out its claims. Once the Senate voted for 
      war, the ambassadors were again sent to the hostile nation to announce the  
      declaration of war and symbolically throw a javelin on enemy soil.36
 
Oftentimes, the way in which modern states employ the use of force in 
warfare is quite different from this approach. Manufacturing of dangerous weapons 
and high levels of technology employed in modern warfare are offered as some of 
the reasons for the use of force by contemporary just war theorists. Some war 
experts and other state authorities argue that it is when one is not affected by a 
calamity that she will prefer non-violence to the use of force. Jean B. Elshtain 
sounds this tone in her evaluation of America’s response to September 11: “It is 
difficult for us to imagine anarchy and dread unless we have been victims of 
random violence of some kind. Otherwise, it is easy for us to lose sense of 
urgency”.37  As a sharp contrast to ancient Rome’s understanding and practice of 
last resort Elshtain provides the American interpretation of last resort: 
     Properly understood, last resort is a resort to armed force taken after deliberation  
     rather than as an immediate reaction. The criterion of last resort does not com- 
      pel a government to try everything else in actual fact but rather to explore other 
      options before concluding that none seems appropriate or viable in light 
                                                 
36 Christopher, P. Ethics of War and Peace (Prentice Hall, Upper Saddle River, New Jersey 1999) 
13. 
37 Elshtain, B.J. Just War Against Terror. (Basic Books 2003) 49. 
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      of the nature of the threat.38
 
 
There is no doubt that this exemplifies a clear description of last resort in the 
light of technologies and sophisticated weapons used in wars among modern states. 
However, it is important to note here that the deliberation Elshtain mentions does 
not take the antagonist to a dialogue as the ancient Rome generals understood the 
term. Last resort then remains the unilateral choice of those who have suffered an 
injury or harm. 
 
What we refer to as “reasonable chance of success” in Just War doctrine 
also has its own dilemmas and complexities especially if we interpret success as 
winning the battle. It presupposes that if we have a just cause and good intention 
and war remains the last resort we should not go to war if there is no hope of 
success.  It practically (not logically) follows that only strong nations are in a 
position to wage war against their weaker opponents. Meanwhile, as has been 
pointed out by war experts, “it is sometimes morally necessary to fight against a 
much larger force, either for the sake of national self-esteem or to protect a 
threatened minority”39 And when weak countries are unable to employ ethical 
means to achieve their aims they are tempted to embark on any means to protect 
themselves, though that might be morally wrong.  
With the above limitations associated with Just War theory, it makes sense 
to reconsider pacifism not just for its opposition to war and violence but to 
                                                 
38 Ibid p. 61 
39 www.bbc.co.uk/religion/ethics/war/justwarintro.shtml, June 15, 2003 
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extrapolate some underlying moral principles which one can develop from it. 
Pacifists are of various kinds; some have ethical and moral reasons for opposing 
violence and war while some set out conditions to be met before endorsing war. 
Traditionally, both Christians and non-Christians have resisted the use of force. 
However, by the insightful works of theologians like Ambrose, Aquinas, and 
Augustine pacifism has gained new impetus in its resistance to the use of force. As 
a result, some pacifists have now become aware of the circumstances in which force 
may be legitimate such that it is even difficult to draw a clear distinction between a 
traditional Just War sympathizer and some groups of pacifists. Some pacifists have 
realized the need to accept a considerable amount of force on some occasions to 
ensure peace and justice. For instance, the argument by Just War Pacifists 
demonstrably runs parallel with the traditional Just War theory. While the 
traditional Just War theorist is genuinely committed to ensuring peace and justice 
by sincerely observing the rules of war, the Just War Pacifist is also worried about 
the changing nature of our traditional notion of Just War. Thus while the former is 
concerned with fighting to ensure peace and justice the latter points out the acts and 
conduct that do not make war a just one.  
The seeming conflict between pacifism and Just War theory occurs for two 
reasons. First, the comparison of pacifism with just war erroneously focuses on 
unconditional pacifism. Here because unconditional pacifism absolutely rejects all 
kinds of use of force there is always a conflict when analyzed in contrast with the 
Just War theory. Second, apparent conflict may also occur when we compare Just 
War Pacifism with contemporary Just War theory because there seems to be a 
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common goal pursued by both the traditional Just War theorist and Just War 
Pacifist which cannot be identified with contemporary Just War theorists due to the 
latter’s changing conception about the conditions of just war. Unlike contemporary 
Just War theory, both traditional Just War theory and Just War Pacifism objectively 
explore non-violent alternatives to conflict resolution before considering resort to 
force.  
 
  In light of the high percentage rate of civilian casualties in modern day 
warfare, the Just War Pacifist’s argument should not be ignored. According to the 
Just War theory, both Jus ad bellum and Jus in bello conventions have to be 
satisfied for a war to be just. Just War Pacifism rejects contemporary Just War 
theory on the grounds that modern day warfare does not satisfy the requirements of 
justice. This denial should not be explained as a total dismissal of lethal force in 
warfare. It may also be explained as an admission of violence based on certain 
specified conditions. That is if modern states meet the required conditions of Just 
War theory the Just War Pacifist theorist will also endorse war. This does not seem 
to make Just War theory any better than some versions of pacifism. Both appear to 
be qualified for considering the situation under which the use of force may be 
legitimate. However, in waging war against terrorism contemporary Just War 
defenders have utterly rejected pacifism due to their intuitive idea of unconditional 
pacifism. It is therefore important to critically examine the grounds on which the 
advocates of the “war on terror” justify pre-emptive use of force. This is what we 
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CHAPTER THREE: CRITICAL EVALUATION OF THE CASE FOR PRE-
EMPTIVE STRIKES AGAINST TERRORISM 
 
3:0: INTRODUCTION: 
In confronting terrorism, state authorities, ethicists and war experts have 
attempted an explanation for rejecting dialogue and for adopting the use of force. 
Some of the reasons they put forward seem to suggest that the “war on terror” is a 
just war. To examine this, I do not directly apply the Just War theory to assess the 
reasons even though its principles are fundamental to my discussion. How should 
we respond to terrorism and why? Some have proposed military force as being a 
necessity to prevent and pre-empt terrorism.40 Others have argued that terrorists 
need to be brought to justice under a proper institutional court.41 Many people also 
think that the killer should be killed and the terrorist terrorized—“an eye for an 
eye”, and “a tooth for a tooth”, nothing more, nothing less. In this chapter, I assess 
the reasons given and react to the “an eye for an eye” response. I conclude that 
responding to terror is a just cause, but it does not necessarily justify a Just War.   
 
3.1: THE CRIME OF TERRORISM 
In contemporary politics, terrorism is sometimes described as a war strategy, 
which involves a deliberate killing of civilian populations in order to achieve 
ideological goals. It has been asserted that terrorism has already begun once 
                                                 
40 This is evident in the speech given by President George W. Bush after September 11. See Current 
History: A Journal of Contemporary World Affairs. May 2003, p. 222  
41 See an article by Frank K. Kelly and Robert B. Laney, 
http://www.wagingpeace.org/articles/01.09/010920kellylaneyproicc.htm, June 8th 2003 
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individuals, a group of people, or a state decides to use violence in self-defense 
while avoiding direct confrontation of the enemy’s military force.42 We might not 
be in a position to enumerate all the acts of terrorism but they clearly include the 
indiscriminate killing of mass populations, humiliation and terror, destruction of 
property, the environment, and regional political order. Understood in these terms, 
no respectable moral theory in philosophy will defend such terrorist atrocities. 
Neither do I think any laws of war will legitimize these acts of terror.  
From its inception, perpetrators of terrorism have always given reasons for 
their acts. For instance, those who oppose capitalist ideology usually mention 
social, economic and political subjugation by the world’s great powers as some of 
the reasons they strike at their enemies. Among our contemporaries, some have 
often cited the protection of human rights and self-determination to legitimize 
terrorist activities, thus making it legally and politically appealing. Nonetheless, 
terrorism intentionally designed to kill civilian populations, including little children 
and innocent adults, fails to be a morally right approach to conflict resolution. It 
does not satisfy the non-combatant criterion of the Geneva War Convention since 
perpetrators intimidate and kill indiscriminately.  From an ethical point of view, it 
can be said that terrorism identifies a problem but it lacks the moral justification for 
its strategy for tackling the problem. In that sense, terrorism tends to connote the 
very idea of “the ends justify any means”. This I think is morally wrong.  
 
                                                 




3.2: REASONS FOR THE WAR ON TERROR  
This is not an attempt to exhaust every reason for the war on terrorism. I 
discuss only the immediate ones that have provoked the heated debate on 
justification for pre-emptive war against terrorism. The challenge is whether 
modern democratic states can refrain from confronting terrorism with military 
strikes and consider other alternatives. Our understanding of the problem of 
terrorism determines the rational response that any reasonable person will propose 
if the aim is to avoid future occurrence. The concept of punishment immediately 
comes to mind in our response to terrorism for the purposes of justice and 
deterrence. Why and how the wrongdoer should suffer is one of the issues that will 
be raised in the last chapter. What is rather pertinent now is our reaction to potential 
or would-be terrorists and those who are suspected of having cooperated with 
terrorist groups. As far as Islamic fundamentalist groups are concerned, those who 
commit atrocities that can be directly dealt with according to the law mostly end 
their lives through suicide bombing. For that reason, policies of direct vengeance 
and retaliation in our reaction to terrorism should carefully be weighed under some 
moral principles, which can restrain modern states from acting under the influence 
of anger and revenge.  
Some of the reasons and theories people give to support military force as a 
response to terrorism may properly be based on the general principles of the ethics 
of war but they seem to contravene international law and some fundamental moral 
principles. International law and treaties permit states to defend themselves against 
threats by an enemy, but they have little to say about pre-emptive and anticipatory 
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wars.  That is to say, it is morally and legally justified for a state to defend itself 
from terrorism. However, states must do so according to the principles of such 
conventions. Consider what President George W. Bush offers to justify the “war on 
terrorism” during his address to the U.S. Military Academy in the aftermath of 
September 11:  
 
          When the spread of chemical and biological and nuclear weapons, along with 
          ballistic missile technology…when that occurs, even weak states and small  
          groups could attain a catastrophic power to strike great nations. Our enemies  
          have declared this very intention, and have been caught seeking these terrible  
          weapons. They want the capability to blackmail us, or to harm us, or to harm 
          our friends…and we will oppose them with all our power…If we wait for 
          threats to fully materialize, we will have waited too long.43
 
 
These are the President’s reasons for launching pre-emptive strikes against 
terrorism. First, we could see multiple reasons for pre-emption—the urgency to 
prevent terrorists from getting access to weapons of mass destruction, the priority of 
self-defense and the protection of the state’s allies. Second, one could trace another 
reason which does not come out plainly but seems to influence the idea that military 
force is the best option for confronting terrorism: the desire to dispense instant 
justice. In the world of global terror, no responsible government will overlook the 
significance of national peace and security. Indeed self-preservation is so crucial 
that it has led many states into armed conflicts. Though philosophers are not 
prophets, it would not be an exaggeration to say that Jenny Teichman correctly 
identified human beings’ unwavering craving for retribution when she rightly 
pointed out many years ago that “Self-defence is the rationale of the two great 
military alliances, NATO and the Warsaw Pact; return of stolen land was the reason 
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(on both sides) for the Falklands War; the desire to punish terrorists might well 
spark off at least a small war one day.”44  The accuracy of Teichman’s prediction is 
clearly evident in current persistent efforts in the ongoing war on terror. The degree 
of violence and the rate of casualty and death in the invasion of Iraq alone is enough 
to call the war against terror a greater war (not a small war).    
Third, the frequent flow of chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons, as 
well as the intention to prevent weak states from attacking great nations provides 
another reason for the war on terror. Finally, one can deduce from the President’s 
speech that it is the appropriate time to wage pre-emptive strikes when great nations 
begin to experience fear about the growing influence of weak states. Attempts to 
discourage the spread of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons are relevant if 
modern states can succeed in building peace and security measures for conflict 
prevention. This is one of the main objectives of the international community in its 
peace-building endeavors. And it has been the concern of most world organizations, 
such as the European Union, in their efforts to prevent violent conflicts on the 
European continent and other parts of the world. So getting involved in policies 
against weapon proliferation is a just cause though not sufficient for a just war. 
Moreover, discouraging the proliferation of these dangerous weapons for the sake 
of world peace and security for all humankind is one thing and preventing weak 
states from acquiring them is another. While the former has a more global concern 
and is less myopic, some moral objections can be raised against the latter.  
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Why is it wrong for weak states to acquire nuclear weapons if great nations like 
Russia, United States, China, India and Pakistan continue to possess them? Is it the 
weapon per se which constitutes a threat to human life or the status and size of the 
state in possession of the weapon that determines world security?  Undoubtedly, 
records indicate that Iraq has threatened its neighbors with dangerous weapons such 
as poison gas and biological weapons, and indeed, Saddam Hussein has even used 
such weapons on soldiers and some civilian populations. That is not enough 
grounds for preventing small states from pursuing weapons of mass destruction 
programs since great nations are also guilty of the same activity. The United States 
for instance, has been condemned for its use of the atomic bomb during World War 
II. Pakistan and India have recently been threatening each other with the use of 
nuclear weapons. An objection that can be raised here is that if great nations 
possess Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), and if some of these great nations 
have ever used their dangerous weapons in the history of warfare, then we cannot 
be convinced that the small state’s possession of WMD or their programs for WMD 
is a good reason for resort to pre-emptive war on terrorism. Neither can we assume 
that the unrelenting war on terror by powerful states to disarm small states may 
necessarily ensure peace.   
On ethical grounds, nothing seems to make it morally permissible for rich 
nations to wage war against small states if they are all guilty of violating the 
fundamental principles of international conventions in warfare. Both small states 
and great nations violate international laws on self-defense. Both end up maiming 
innocent civilians even though that appears the main target of the terrorist.  Both are 
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guilty of inflicting bodily human pain and harm. Both the terrorist and the self-
defendant are driven by what Trudy Govier refers to as the “policy of rough 
battlefield justice”45, the idea that the offender must die because she has denied 
another’s right to life. Subscription to this idea caricatures political culture of 
modern democratic states which perceives terrorism as barbaric and inhuman. 
Adopting such a cynical approach more or less brings the civilized state to the same 
level as the terrorist whose approach to human rights defense and self-
determination seems to reject ethical reflection on war strategy as irrelevant. 
Similar features may be ascribed to both the terrorist and the civilized democratic 
state if the latter loses its sense of fair justice principles in democratic culture.  
It may be said that they both have been confronted by political challenges, 
allowing emotions, fear, anger, and self-interest to influence their actions. And this 
is likely to prevent any civilized state from playing a constructive role in world 
peace and security. Thus, if small states pursue weapons of mass destruction in 
order to threaten, dominate, and to attack, the strong nations are equally vulnerable 
to the same temptation. President George W. Bush’s response to September 11 
made this clear when he passionately declared that the U.S. would use any kind of 
weapons on its enemies. In fact, if we think that the threats of terrorism can be 
overcome by preventing small states from acquiring weapons of mass destruction 
then we would have a long way to go. This is because we are overlooking the 
ultimate aim of terrorism; and I am afraid we might not succeed in a self-defense 
war if we lose sight of what the terrorist is up to.   
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Certain key concepts and some basic significant questions will remain 
unanswered if our attention is focused only on weapons of mass destruction in 
getting rid of terrorism. For instance, how do we overcome hatred? Can we be sure 
of our security after the war on terror? It is as if destroying the enemy’s program of 
weapons of mass destruction necessarily restores the defendant states’ broken 
international relations with the rest of the world. It is not what the terrorists will use 
and how the terrorists will strike that matters; for we should be much more 
concerned about why the terrorists strike and who the terrorists have in mind as 
their target. We may destroy the entire enemy’s weapons of mass destruction (if 
they really have any) and even strip them completely of anything similar to that 
without being able to uproot terrorism. For example, was it not just ordinary knives 
that the attackers of September 11 used to hijack the planes needed to commit their 
atrocities? This implies that our safety doesn’t depend on what the enemies possess 
but rather what our enemies think about us.    
For this reason, we need to identify the peculiar nature of contemporary 
terrorism and what the perpetrators are up to. Michael Walzer has observed that “In 
war, terrorism is a way of avoiding engagement with the enemy army”.46 Thus the 
strategy of terrorists is to avoid direct confrontation with their opponents, perhaps 
due to the strong military power of their enemies. One may therefore interpret 
Walzer’s definition of terrorism as another kind of warfare. For instance, in an 
article “States, Terrorists, and the Clash of Civilizations”, Jack A. Goldstone 
describes terrorism as a political organization rather than a criminal act.47 From a 
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strategic point of view, terrorism in one sense may be described as warfare since it 
mainly employs suicide bombing to hit its targets. In this sense, the reasonable 
pacifist may find it difficult to discourage victim states from using force in return. 
But terrorism can be viewed from a different angle too— it is not a desire to 
conquer; not direct craving for domination per se; or a yearning for superior power 
to rule the world. It is more or less an unethical means of expressing dissatisfaction 
with Western influence and military attacks on the Middle Easterners’ beliefs and 
aspirations within their sub-region. More specifically, terrorists are displeased with 
military strikes and violence perpetrated by the U.S. — a perennial conflict having 
the potential to affect future generations if nothing is done about its international 
relations with the rest of the Arab world. 
Indeed, terrorists are less powerful in terms of military capacities if they 
were to confront their opponents directly. Luiz Carlos Bresser-Pereira hits the nail 
on the head in pointing out that “The states where fundamentalism thrives and 
terrorism is born are poor and weak states where modernization has been 
frustrated”48 For this reason, some have argued that the terrorists are cowards. But I 
think it is high time to discard the idea of ascribing cowardice to terrorism since 
cowardice is not consistent with the very acts of suicide bombing associated with 
contemporary terrorism. Neither does it make any sense to launch systematic 
military strikes on people we designate as cowards. It is our responsibility to 
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48 Luiz Carlos Bresser-Pereira “After Balance-of-Powers Diplomacy, Globalization’s Politics” in 
Eric Hershberg and Kevin W. Moore, ed., Critical Views of September 11: Analyses From Around 
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objectively evaluate the antecedents to terrorism; otherwise a mere suspicion of our 
enemy’s WMD will not be enough reason to justify the new pre-emptive war on 
terror.   
Nevertheless, there are still other reasons people give to justify military 
strikes and pre-emptive wars against terrorism. Jean B. Elshtain provides one such 
reason. She writes: 
      What is one to do with the likes of bin Laden and Al Qaeda? They present no  
       accountable, organized entity to engage—no sovereign state. They are not parties  
      to any structure of diplomacy and thus cannot be negotiated with; in any event,  
        because what they seek is our destruction, there is nothing to negotiate about.49
 
Elshtain’s observation also clearly portrays the true nature of contemporary 
terrorism. It is very important because it highlights the difficulties involved in 
adopting non-violent and diplomatic approaches to the phenomenon. And of course, 
getting isolated terrorist groups and organizations scattered around the globe to the 
conference table for peace talks appears unrealistic. Yet, through a diligent search, 
an intelligence source has been able to uncover the network of terrorism engineered 
by the Islamic extremists and militants who are believed to be responsible for the 
September 11 attacks.50 This is the proof that pre-emptive strikes against terrorism 
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50 Gorden Corera reports that “At the head of Al-Qaida, Osama bin Laden has been more of a 
symbol around which to draw Muslim support than some kind of all-powerful terrorist CEO who 
directs every operation…Many of the activities carried out under the banner of Al-Qaida are 
executed with limited support from the centre, and around bin Laden are a small core of experienced 
terrorists, any one of whom could step into his shoes, even if they lack the dark charisma and global 
reputation that has built up. ..Rather than a bureaucratic hierarchical organization, it is highly fluid 
network, flexible enough to work in different cultures and exploit globalization by operating in the 
gaps between national authorities in policing, finance and intelligence. Despite its image as a 
terrorist network, Al-Qaida itself may only number a few thousand members, instead acting literally 
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wouldn’t be a necessity since we have the logistics and resources - both human and 
material - that can be utilized to explore other alternatives for resolving the problem 
of terrorism. How consistent is it to use force on those we claim one cannot meet 
for negotiation due to their non-organized and non-entity nature? An intelligence 
source grants that Islamic extremist terrorist networks extend far beyond the Middle 
East region. It is said that the presence of Islamic extremist terrorist movements can 
now be felt in Europe, Africa, Asia, and North America including the United 
States.51 Thus the non-organized nature of the network does not seem to suggest 
military force as the last resort in this scenario. Let’s assume that the terrorists are 
hiding in caves thus making it difficult to engage them in negotiation and peace 
talks. That alone should not rule the process of dialogue since the terrorists do exist 
among their antagonists. The counter-terror response in international politics 
especially in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict reveals that terrorists feel, they observe, 
they hear, they communicate, and they sometimes (if not constantly) express their 
worries and anxieties through the media and in other literary works. So the view 
that pre-emptive strikes against terrorism are only the option is debatable. If it is the 
case that one cannot meet his enemy for peaceful negotiation then I wonder how 
resorting to military force against his supporters can be successful. On the other 
hand, if we assume that the use of force against the sympathizers and supporters of 
terrorism will minimize the nefarious acts of terrorism, then I don’t think we will 
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make any moral progress by refusing to negotiate peacefully with the supporters, 
suspected, would-be, and potential terrorists who are believed to be aspiring to a 
common goal with the actual terrorists. This, I think, is also not any strong reason 
for pre-emptive strikes against terrorism because the ability to come out with facts 
about the terrorist network alone indicates the possibility of other options that can 
be explored before resorting to the use of force.  
Anticipatory war on terror against the Islamic fundamentalist groups is a self-
defense war placing the United States of America and the Arab world in constant 
struggle. But a civilized nation built on democratic principles of freedom, liberty, 
justice, and rule of law should distinguish itself by the way it proceeds with conflict 
resolution in contrast with the way the so-called barbaric states handle their socio-
economic and political struggles. The reality of the matter is that once we identify 
terrorists as our ‘destroyers’ we are tempted to be driven by emotions in responding 
to the problem. Human beings have the tendency to kick back when attacked by an 
enemy. Sometimes the impulse of revenge strongly moves us to consider first ‘an 
eye for an eye’ approach rather than to think of any other concept of justice based 
on fair moral principles. In such situations dialogue is essential if we can be morally 
consistent. But from the way some scholars present their resentment, it seems the 
advocates of “rough battlefield justice” are not ready for negotiation and 
reconciliation. For instance, reflecting on the nefarious acts of September 11, 
Elshtain passionately points out: 
       Other events may have crowded out memories of that horrible day in 2001,  
        and the waters may have started to close over. Some of us may be forgetting  
        what it was really like. We shouldn’t. It was as bad as we remember it.  
        Our emotions at the time were not extreme: They were appropriate to the  
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        horror. Anger remains an appropriate feeling.52  
 
The September 11 attack was bad, no doubt about that. And every reasonable 
moral thinker has acknowledged that. However, since the harm has already been 
caused it may be said that one cannot succeed in avoiding a similar occurrence as 
long as anger continues to color our response to the attacks. The influence of anger 
explains why the victim states seem to prefer policies of retaliatory terror against 
the perpetrators rather than a fair legal and moral response to the problem of 
terrorism. In conflicts, anger precedes vengeance while vengeance usually fails to 
draw a line between criminal justice and crime. It is only when fundamental moral 
principles are applied in our response to wrongdoing that any significant distinction 
can be drawn between a particular wrong act and the response of justice to the act 
itself. Without that, our attitude toward perpetrators of terrorism may blur our 
concept of criminal justice. This became evident in an Internet poll that was 
conducted to seek public opinion about what should be done to Osama bin Laden 
when captured. According to the report, 70% out of 200,000 responses proposed 
that he should right away be executed as against those who advocated a legal trial.53 
Trudy Govier argues, and I agree, that the criminal offender who kills seems to 
have given up his right to life but he must not be denied his right to a fair trial if we 
value judgment based on rational legal justification. 
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The reasons people offer for anticipatory military strikes against terror seem to be 
influenced by the spirit of revenge and retaliation. They lack moral and legal 
backing when examined from a neutral point of view. The argument for military 
pre-emption against terrorism does not draw any distinction between actual 
terrorists and potential terrorists.54 A fundamental legal objection can be raised 
here. Isn’t the accused supposed to be considered innocent prior to her conviction? 
Legal experts agree that under common law, labeling a person a potential or 
suspected killer does not necessarily warrant punishment if one has not been 
convicted. In the same vein, if attackers kill themselves in suicide bombing then I 
think it is ethically and legally questionable to wage pre-emptive war against 
suspected sponsors and potential terrorists who have not yet been convicted of such 
crimes.  Pre-emptive use of force which does not properly base its justification on 
international law and moral principles is unethical, illegal and dangerous for future 
posterity. Such a response will be unethical because there will be no clear 
difference between crime and justice. Terrorism, as already discussed in this paper, 
is prima facie wrong because it seems to support the “end justifies any means” 
slogan. A quite distinct approach is required as an antidote to terrorism; otherwise 
there would not be any significant difference between the political cultures of the 
states in conflict. Terror and counter-terror will reduce both the democratic and the 
barbaric states to the same moral status.  
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Writing under the title ‘The Mind of the Terrorist’ Fergal Keane, a BBC reporter, 
presents a case where an Islamic fundamentalist parent encourages his young child 
to learn to commit crime, violence, and retaliation against the U.S. Keane echoes 
William Butler Yeast’s observation at a stadium in Quetta, Pakistan and writes: 
     
        I was surrounded by young men waving posters of Osama bin Laden and 
         screaming ‘death to America’. I approached a man holding a boy-I guessed  
         his age to be about twelve-and asked if he agreed with the message.  
        ‘Most certainly I do and I am teaching him that it is his responsibility to  
         Follow the road of Jihad.’ 
         Didn’t he worry about teaching a child to hate? 
       ‘Well, yes of course it is wrong to hate, but in this case it is right.’55
 
In contrast to Kant’s categorical imperative, the man believes that certain 
acts are wrong depending on the circumstances under which the acts are committed. 
Allah commands Muslims to love so hatred is sinful in Islamic religion. But the 
man’s own belief system influenced by anger and desire for retaliation and 
vengeance justifies the hatred he has for America. In addition, he sees the need to 
indoctrinate his son so that the conflict and struggle continues into the future. What 
difference would it make if America also has a similar view about its enemies? Our 
familiar old adage will judge it as ‘two wrongs never make a right’. Neither may we 
accept excuses and reasons as enough grounds to justify our self-defense struggles 
as long as they are based on personal idiosyncrasies. 
But reasons become subtle when supported by seemingly rational 
arguments. This takes me to the examination of the concept of the reasonableness 
test in philosophy and politics, which can clearly be distinguished from the familiar 
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rational person test when dealing with issues of liberty and security. After all the 
conflict between the great powerful states and the weaker ones may be described as 
a contention over liberty and security. The reasonableness test is a concept that has 
been applied in legal cases to try criminals under common laws and tort laws. It is 
applied to deal with controversial legal cases associated with crime that involves 
excuse, luck, consent, mistakes, and self-defense. But I think the same concept of 
reasonableness test can be applied in dealing with conflicts between sovereign 
states. Both liberty and security are significant principles in legal and political 
philosophy which societies must regulate if its members are to live in peace and 
harmony. The relevance of liberty as a political concept is built on the assumption 
that self-determination and personal autonomy are necessary for human beings to 
live freely and pursue their own interests so as to develop their potential. On the 
other hand, people also need to be protected against unnecessary harm and pain 
inflicted by others as they maximize their rights and liberty in societies. We may all 
have reasons and excuses for performing an action or behaving in a certain manner. 
But the reasonableness concept can help us to determine the moral rightness or 
wrongness of our actions.  
Arthur Ripstein employs the reasonableness test in law and politics to 
discuss how the borders of one people’s liberty and another’s security can be 
regulated.56 When states interact with other states, there cannot be mutual 
cooperation and solidarity if they embrace the extremes of liberty and security. In 
other words, there can be no fair terms of interaction if there is only the protection 
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of liberty without people’s security; neither can there be freedom and justice when 
security alone is protected without granting a people their rights to act freely and 
ensure their political freedom. Therefore, liberty and security must be balanced in 
fair terms as states interact with others. How do we strike the balance between one 
state’s security and another’s liberty? In explaining how this can be achieved 
Ripstein mentions two ways but he fully discusses only one.57 The first is what he 
describes as a sort of utilitarian version of moral and political thought which 
maintains that the limits of liberty and security be set in such a way that one 
person’s liberty will be curtailed by another’s security. The second, which he 
develops, introduces an idea of a representative person who is supposed to take 
pleasure in both liberty and security. Thus a representative person may be explained 
as the one who applies the reasonableness test in complex situations to avoid 
conflict of interest. If all states have interest in liberty and security then it is by 
reaching equilibrium of the extreme ends of liberty and security within the 
representative person that the idea of the principles of equality for all comes to play.  
The terrorist who strikes does so in order to defend her liberty, freedom and 
self-determination. The victim state also needs to be protected and secured from 
such atrocities. How can a state secure its members from an attack without denying 
another’s inalienable rights? The concept of the reasonable person in common-law 
presents the notion of a fair balance between liberty and security. The reasonable 
person when confronted by this challenge will not act out of self-interest; he will 
not behave under pretence, and will not allow himself to be deluded by the 
influence of the enemy’s wrongdoing. As portrayed by Arthur Ripstein, the 
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reasonable person rather takes “precautions against accidentally injuring others, 
making only allowable mistakes, and maintaining an appropriate level of self-
control when provoked.”58 Thus the agent responding to social and political 
challenges under the reasonableness test analyses issues from an objective point of 
view. It is how state authorities and officials respond to crises like contemporary 
terrorism that determines their sense of social and political maturity. If we place 
ourselves in the shoes of the terrorist, how would we wish to be treated? It is easy to 
propose a “rough battlefield” policy and colorfully present it by rational arguments. 
But such arguments can hardly be defended under the concept of the reasonable 
person. Ripstein further echoes John Rawls and distinguishes the reasonable person 
from the rational person. While he identifies the rational person with someone who 
acts effectively to promote her ends, the reasonable person rather aims at fair and 
equal terms of social cooperation as she interacts with others. The moral agent 
acting under the reasonableness test in legal and political philosophy will not accept 
any reason for self-defense wars against terrorism without carefully striking the 
balance between liberty of the weak states and the security of the strong states.  
In sum, even though the seeming non-organized nature of terrorist groups 
and the weapons of mass destruction program pursued by weak states are important 
reasons, I think they are not conclusive reasons for military use of force against 
terrorism. It may be argued that since prudential rationality is an efficiency notion 
of achieving an end, the methods of the terrorists may well be rational. And so one 
may expect the terrorists to be reasonable. This carries commitment to the system of 
law and makes dialogue very essential in dealing with terrorism.   
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Reasons for the justification of extreme use of violence in self-defense may 
fail to draw any significant difference between criminal justice, which great nations 
claim to be administering and the criminal acts of terrorism. The justification of 
military strikes against terrorism should have to be built only on neutral moral 
principles and must have a strong legal backing. Reasons (even if they give rise to 
just cause) are not sufficient justification for just war. So a strong defense for the 
justification of pre-emption against terror needs to be found outside the enumerated 
reasons.  This leads us to the discussion of the relationship between international 
















CHAPTER FOUR: INTERNATIONAL LAW ON SELF-DEFENSE AND 
PRE-EMPTIVE STRIKES 
“We can never introduce a modifying principle into the philosophy of war without 
committing an absurdity”                                                      ....Karl von Clausewitz59
 
4.0: Introduction 
  Because the justification of war is an international issue it may not be 
sufficient to assess the legitimacy of pre-emptive strikes against terrorism based on 
the views of individuals and groups like the pacifists, the Just War theorists or the 
rational self-interest advocates. It is important to consider international law, 
customs and treaties regulating self-defense and pre-emptive strikes which are 
considered binding on all states in their interaction with other states. This chapter 
reviews an argument that has recently been put forward as legal support for the 
“war on terror”. I acknowledge the relevance of the argument but I point out that 
going beyond the limits of international law (UN Charter) to justify pre-emptive 
strikes against terrorism introduces two forms of justification—justification by 
reason and justification by law.60  I think that because anticipatory war is a form of 
self-defense (though in its extremes), international law on self-defense against 
aggression should also regulate pre-emptive strikes against terrorism.  
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4.1: The War of Pre-emption 
That one cannot alter the logic of war without contradicting oneself is an 
important observation by Clausewitz. The contradiction is evident in Khilafah’s 
ancient political oxymoron, which goes like this: “Can a person hit back before the 
first punch is thrown?”61 It appears theoretically impossible, but the world has 
experienced a similar situation in the history of war. Israel launched pre-emptive62 
war against Egypt when Egypt threatened to strike the former in 1967. Again, what 
is currently going on in Iraq – the U.S. “war on terror” which has led a coalition 
force in Iraq is a similar encounter. Unless one grants that a threat is a sort of “first 
punch” pre-emptive strikes may be said to be acts which contradict the philosophy 
of war since it permits the would-be enemy to be punished or attacked before he 
strikes.   
Such an exercise raises some questions. Are there any justifications for such 
wars? Does international law on self-defense sanction anticipatory war and pre-
emptive strikes? How are they regulated in international politics? What provision 
does international law make for self-defense? How should a state decide when its 
national laws conflict with international law? In what follows, we examine how the 
above questions can be answered. 
Since a pre-emptive strike is a typical self-defense tactic enshrined in 
international law let us consider what international law has to say about anticipatory 
self-defense and how the advocates of pre-emptive strikes also interpret those 
principles of international law. Undeniably, international law acknowledges the 
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importance of individual and collective self-defense against any possible attack. In 
the same vein, sovereignty and equality of all states are also considered as the 
fundamental principles that the international legal system seeks to enhance. In this 
regard, there are strict rules regulating state intervention, threat or the use of force, 
and how states may defend themselves from foreign aggression. As it is understood, 
anticipatory self-defense or pre-emptive strike is a doctrine that allows a state to 
respond to an impending threat before such a threat is carried out. States should, 
however, provide some justification for their military interventions in pre-emptive 
self-defense exercises. Basically, there are two main sources of international law 
that a state may appeal to, to defend herself from the threat of force - the United 
Nations (UN) Charter and Customary International Law. Here are the principles 
under each of these two sources of justificatory self-defense. 
 
4.2: The UN Charter on Self-defense 
First, Article 2(4) prohibits the threat or any use of force by states against 
other independent states63. However, Article 51 (stated below) permits states to 
defend themselves under certain conditions. Article 51 of the UN Charter reads:  
      Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or  
       Collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the  
       United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to 
       maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the  
       exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Sec- 
       urity Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility 
       of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such act- 
       ion as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace 
       and security. 
 
                                                 
63 According to Article 2(4) of the UN, “All Members shall refrain from their international relations 
from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, 
or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations”. 
 61
The UN Charter permits self-defense against aggression. But the Charter, as 
stipulated in Article 2(4) requires that the self-defense should not contravene the 
aims of the United Nations. Thus Article 2(4) in the light of the requirements of 
Article 51 does not seem to permit the unilateral and perhaps bilateral use of force 
against any sovereign state without the approval of the UN Security Council. 
Member states can do so only when authorized by the Security Council. This 
implies that anticipatory self-defense may be legally justified when it is sanctioned 
by the Security Council or when it serves the rationale behind the formation of the 
UN. While the 51st Article acknowledges the necessity of a state’s security against 
an enemy’s attack, it does also place a restriction by providing the circumstances 
under which self-defense is legitimate and the procedure that member states should 
comply with in defending themselves. In real terms, the circumstance where the 
state’s use of force becomes legitimate according to article 51 is during an “armed 
attack”. And the procedure or process member states should follow before 
employing military force in self-defense is to communicate its decision to the 
Security Council for approval. Thus in the case of the September 11, 2001, attack, it 
would have been morally and legally consistent if the U.S. had defended itself 
against the hijackers ‘during’ the act.  
Let us examine the Charter’s provision for future attack and previous attack 
i.e. ‘before’ an attack begins or ‘after’ an attack has been made. The Charter is not 
silent on these scenarios. Article 51 requires that any decision about self-defense by 
the Victim State “shall be immediately reported to the Security Council”. Indeed, it 
is controversial that the right of self-defense is curtailed by the power of the 
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Security Council. The advocates of anticipatory self-defense find this restriction a 
total denial of the state’s inherent right to pre-emptive self-defense. But I do not 
think that the injunction justifies its violation no matter how complicated this may 
seem, since being signatory to the charter carries with it certain responsibilities with 
which all member states of the UN must comply. After all, for the purpose of 
allowing the Security Council to act promptly in playing its peace and security role, 
member states agree in principle to surrender their sovereign power.64 One has to 
provide moral and legal justification for violating these criteria. For this reason, 
arguments that appear to be inconsistent with the provision by Articles 2(4) and 51 
have been mounted from international customary law sources to defend pre-emptive 
strikes against terrorism. 
 
4.3: International Customary Law And Pre-Emptive Strikes  
International Customary law refers to unwritten conventions, treaties and 
accepted norms that are usually also recognized as the basis of international law. 
Here, I discuss only one, but it is a fascinating argument that appeals to 
international customary law to advocate anticipatory self-defense against terrorism. 
In an article ‘Anticipatory Self Defense: The Terrorism Exception’65, Mikael F. 
Nabati, (the president of the H.W. Briggs Society of International Law in the United 
States) puts forward an argument for pre-emptive strikes against terrorism. He 
exposes the weaknesses and unrealistic nature of articles 2(4) and 51 and examines 
                                                 




65 See The Current History: A Journal of Contemporary World Affairs. May 2003. 
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the conditions under which he thinks international customary law may permit pre-
emptive strike. Nabati further presents the challenges posed by contemporary 
terrorism and finally argues for anticipatory self-defense against terrorism. 
What does Nabati find wrong with the UN charter on the issue of self-
defense?  Nabati’s worry about the strict requirements of articles 2(4) and 51 for the 
invocation of anticipatory self defense is that, first, they allow states the right to 
defend themselves only when an “armed attack” has begun but not when the attack 
has ended or when it is yet to be carried out. Second, in the traditional sense an 
“armed attack” implies an attack by military action targeting a state’s territory, 
population, or its possessions by another state. Hence, Nabati points out that 
because contemporary terrorism (such as those of Tokyo subway in 1995 and 
September 11, 2001 attacks) are perpetrated by ordinary civilians who do not 
usually equip themselves with military weapons they are immune from the “armed 
attack” criterion. Nabati therefore contends that a state may find it difficult to 
satisfy Article 51’s self-defense requirements66. Third, by reserving the power in 
the Security Council to decide when a state may launch self-defense, he thinks that 
the state’s discretionary right to defend itself is totally denied. So because the UN 
Charter does not make any provision for pre-emptive strikes, Nabati argues that it is 
not enough to rely on the Charter for pre-emptive self-defense against the terrorists. 
This explains why he delves into another source of international law—International 
Customary Law—to consider the justification of pre-emptive war against terrorism. 
 
                                                 
66 Nabati argues, “…the September 11 attacks resulted from individuals using civilian aircraft, 
armed with nothing more than knives. Similarly, the sarin gas attack on the Tokyo subway system 
by the Aum Shinrikyo sect on March 20, 1995 did not involve the use of military weapons”. 
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The Caroline doctrine is one of the most popular international customary laws that 
scholars usually allude to, to justify the use of force in self-defense. So it features 
prominently in Nabati’s article as well. Historically, the Caroline doctrine was 
formulated based on conditions enumerated by Daniel Webster in the nineteenth 
century when British troops invaded the U.S. in 1837 to demolish their ship, The 
Caroline, a vessel used by the U.S. as an instrument of support for Canadian 
political struggles against Britain. In response to this, Britain struck the U.S. in the 
name of self-defense, but Daniel Webster, then U.S. Secretary of State, condemned 
this attack and emphasized that pre-emptive use of force is justified only when there 
is “a necessity of self-defense…instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, 
and no moment for deliberation.”67 Webster’s conditions since then have remained 
part of the standard requirements of pre-emptive use of force in self-defense under 
customary international law. They are conditions that most contemporary war 
ethicists uncritically use to endorse the use of force. And it is diametrically opposed 
to the deliberative approach of conflict resolution or the last resort principle in the 
traditional Just War theory as practiced by the ancient Roman generals68 perhaps 
because the ancient Roman generals never experienced any such imminent threats 
as modern states encounter.  
 Apparently, like Article 51 of the UN Charter, the Caroline doctrine’s 
imminence requirement also does not seem to permit self-defense against an attack 
                                                 
67 Ibid. p.224. See also Just and Unjust Wars, by Michael Walzer (1977) p.74. There is, however, a 
discrepancy in the date of the Caraline doctrine formulation – while Nabati mentions 1837 Michael 
Walzer dates it to 1842. 
68 In Ancient Rome, steps were taken to explore all peaceful and nonviolence techniques of dispute 
resolution before recourse to the use of force. In his Ethics of War & Peace, Paul Christopher (1999) 
provides examples of this.  
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which has already occurred – a restriction that Nabati has noted but strongly 
opposes: 
           To justify preemptive use of force in self-defense, however, customary  
             international law requires that the threat be imminent…Under the Caro- 
             line doctrine, the right of self-defense is only valid as long as the immedi- 
             ate threat lasts.69
 
This suggests that under international customary law too, there is no 
justification for defensive use of force against an attack which is about to happen or 
an attack which has already occurred. And yet Nabati does not seem to completely 
agree with the restriction of The Caroline case in his efforts to justify pre-emptive 
strikes by international customary law. For him, “Customary international law as 
formulated by the Caroline doctrine does not expressly prohibit the exercise of 
anticipatory self-defense.”70 Nonetheless, like the U.N. Charter the Caroline case 
clearly reveals that a state may respond to an attack for self-defense but the defense 
is legally justified as long as the attack is in progress. Thus in both theory and 
practice, there seem to be restrictions and opposition to self-defense war waged 
after an attack or before an attack. One may not accept the absolute pacifist 
rejection of war yet it is significant to acknowledge the restraints by other 
recognized theories of justice and war on the excessive use of force, especially in 
anticipatory self-defense. Just War pacifism also questions the so-called just 
principles in modern wars. The UN Charter permits self-defense only during an 
“armed attack” or with the Security Council’s approval. International Customary 
Law also allows pre-emptive use of force only when the threat is ‘imminent’. So 
                                                 
69 Nabati, M. “Anticipatory Self-Defense: The Terrorism Exception” in The Current History: A 
Journal of Contemporary World Affairs. May 2003 p.224. 
70 Ibid. 
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what else can states appeal to for the justification of anticipatory self-defense and 
counter-attack to terrorism?  
Nabati responds to this by re-examining the challenges posed by terrorism 
and by giving other reasons to support his argument. He argues that since 
contemporary terrorist attacks may use instruments that can cause instant 
destruction of a large percentage of a state’s population there is no need to wait 
until an attack begins. Also, he contends that the support and sponsorship of 
terrorist organizations is as dangerous and horrendous as terrorism, but a state 
cannot claim self-defense against it since that is not an “armed attack” per se.71 
Again Nabati reflects on both articles 2(4) and 51 and offers alternative 
interpretations. He thinks article 2(4) will permit pre-emptive strikes against 
terrorism if the use of force does not affect a state’s “territorial integrity” or 
“political independence”. For Nabati, since the architects of the UN Charter did not 
intend to place the right of self-defense within the power of the Security Council, 
article 51’s restriction of self-defense to an armed attack should be widened to 
include terrorism. He finally reviews historical practices of the use of force in self-
defense against threats to legitimize anticipatory war. Therefore, he concludes “not 
only is anticipatory self-defense implicitly recognized by the UN Charter and 
customary international law, but the international community has accepted and 
                                                 
71 Nabati buttresses his point by citing the Nicaragua v. United States of America (1984-1986) case. 
When the US justified its use of force in retaliation to Nicaragua’s support of rebels in El-Salvador 
for self-defense, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) dismissed it and drew a distinction between 
an “armed attack” and an “assistance to rebels”. The court interpreted Article 51’s “armed attack” as 
when a state crosses a border with “ armed bands, groups, irregulars or mercenaries which carry out 
acts of armed force against another state of such gravity as to amount to an actual armed attack by 
regular forces” (The Current History: A Journal of Contemporary World Affairs. May 2003page 
225)     
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integrated its legitimacy through state practice”72. Surprisingly, what is apparent 
from Nabati’s enumeration of historical practices of self-defense war is the 
admission that apart from the 1981 instance when Israel struck the Osirak nuclear 
power plant of Iraq, it was the U.S. authorities that declared all the rest instances of 
force on the grounds of self-defense. This is an indication that the U.S. appears to 
be one of the chief proponents of the anticipatory self-defense doctrine. And 
whether we should take the U.S.’s unilateral deployment of military force in pre-
emptive strikes as the international community’s acceptance of pre-emptive strikes 
is also contested. In what follows, we attempt a critical analysis of Nabati’s grounds 
for the justification of pre-emptive strikes against terrorism from the Just War 
Pacifist perspective.  
 
4.4: A Reply to F. Nabati 
Nabati’s article is a thoughtful and insightful work that has to be 
reconsidered for self-defense against terrorism. However, I think uncritical 
acceptance of the argument will also justify the violation of the UN Charter by 
member states. Hence I raise some objections against Nabati’s paper. First, the 
argument presents the exercise of a state’s military power without considering the 
significance of external control of that power. In calling for the review of 
international law on self-defense, Nabati laments “The current legal regime of self-
defense under customary international law and Article 51 of the UN Charter place 
strict requirements on the invocation of states to defend themselves”.73 Some 
                                                 
72 Ibid, p227 
73 Ibid, p.223. 
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aspects of modern states’ constitutions are formulated in such a way that they can 
be modified through practice as the changing behavior of the people within the 
states may require. But the same may not be said about international law if the 
purpose is of particular interest to a few privileged states.  
Why should the law permitting war by military forces which may claim 
thousands of lives including innocents be so flexible? Raising a question about the 
flexibility of laws in order to prevent mass killing seems to imply a perfectionism 
doctrine, the view that states should never think of committing certain acts because 
such acts are wrong in themselves. Perhaps such a question is not worth asking 
since one may respond by arguing that flexibility of such laws is important because 
it will enable military forces to fight in order to save tens and hundreds of 
thousands of innocent people as well. So let us ask the question again in a different 
way.  Would there be a need to complain about the rigid nature of international laws 
if altering such laws enabled all states to wage self-defense wars? I do not think so. 
It is obvious that we cannot argue for self-defense wars if we do not possess the 
ability and all the logistics required for winning such wars. The argument fails to 
admit that when international law of self-defense is flexible there will be 
widespread instances of violent conflicts even among the few rich and powerful 
nations. The constraints should be understood as a means of promoting international 
peace and order. Modern states, which have the military strength to wage self-
defense wars, are usually tempted to argue for the change of international laws for 
their own advantage and interests.  
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 Nabati’s argument underscores how military superiority of the great powers 
motivates the use of military force in conflict resolution. In a way, the argument 
denies the relevance of the other principles of the Just War doctrine, especially, the 
last resort and the object of peace criteria. An examination of the reasons and 
excuses that some people have offered for pre-emptive use of force against 
terrorism in Chapter Three suggests that state officials may dispense with 
alternative approaches to confront terrorism before considering the use of force. 
States should not be motivated to wage self-defense wars by only the “reasonable 
chance of success” criterion. The fact that a state has the means to launch pre-
emptive war against the imminent threat of terrorism does not justify the whole 
exercise. The moral and legal justification of such self-defense wars is of 
paramount importance in an age of global terror. As one cannot justify terrorism on 
the grounds that it is the strength of the weak who seem to have been suppressed by 
the dominion of western culture and ideology, so one cannot justify pre-emptive 
strike against terrorism if it is not sanctioned by international law governing all 
states.   
 Nabati’s article does not seem to foster adherence to the formal mandate of 
the UN Charter on how conflicts should be resolved among states. The Charter 
requires that member states deploy military force only when an attack is in progress 
or their response to aggression is reported to the Security Council for its approval. 
And yet the argument for pre-emptive strikes against terrorism contravenes this 
significant injunction. This undermines the strength and power of international law 
whose neutrality works towards the recognition of all states as sovereign and equal. 
 70
Meanwhile the concepts of peace and justice are international subject matter whose 
precepts require the compliance by all states irrespective of a state’s wealth, power, 
status, and geographical boundary. Notwithstanding this, some states are more 
inclined to prioritize national laws over international law when they are involved in 
conflicts with other states. For instance, though the U.S. has been playing a 
significant role in health, poverty alleviation, international trade and other 
peacekeeping missions, its policies for international cooperation and other global 
issues, such as dispute resolution, do not seem to conform to international standards 
especially when the conflict directly affects America or its allies. Nabati’s call for 
illegal deployment of military force against terrorists typifies the unique standard 
which America is adopting in its relationship with the rest of the world.  For 
instance, in an article ‘War is Peace’ Arundhati Roy affirms how America 
distinguishes itself in responding to conflicts as she quotes Madeleine Albright: 
"The U.S. acts multilaterally when it can, and unilaterally when it must."74 The 
challenges of contemporary terrorism may really call for an urgent review of the 
UN Charter but I doubt the legitimacy of unilateral or bilateral preventive strikes 
without the Security Council’s approval.  
Radical as Mikael Nabati’s argument to override the internationally 
accepted norms appears, it more or less depicts the American unique version of a 
just war. Over the years, the U.S. has virtually developed its own interpretation and 
application of the just war principles when provoked by other sovereign states. But 
this is not the moral basis of preventive wars upon which past state officials built 
                                                 
74 http://www.wagingpeace.org/articles/01.11/011118royarundhati.htm [accessed June 8, 2003]. 
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the American nation. In contrast to Nabati’s argument, state officials and other 
concerned U.S. citizens who have realized the need to build peace and justice on 
fair terms of social cooperation have constantly expressed their opposition to 
preventive wars. Some former American presidents and other state officials rejected 
preventive war except those for self-defense or collective defense against armed 
aggression. For instance, during the Korean conflict, the U.S. declared to the world 
its perception about preventive strikes when President Truman proclaimed the 
American policy: “We do not believe in aggressive or preventive war. Such war is 
the weapon of dictators, not of free democratic countries.”75 Thus when we 
compare the President’s declaration with Nabati’s argument it clearly points out 
America’s withdrawal from its ideal philosophy of war. Such a comparison also 
raises an objection to the bizarre justification of the ongoing “war on terror”, for 
fighting in defense of a state when it is being attacked is one thing, and fighting 
with the aim of protecting a state from a suspected enemy is another. The former is 
legally and morally justified; but the justification of the latter is controversial unless 
we agree with America’s new concept of Just War by accepting preventive war as 
justified by the circumstances preceding the resort to force rather than the standards 
of international law and the traditional Just War theory. The critic may say that 
since threats are more serious than mere suspicions pre-emptive strikes against the 
former should be permitted. In Chapter Five, we will examine threats in detail and 
consider what sort of threat should warrant pre-emptive strikes. 
 
                                                 
75 Address to the Nation, September 1, 1950 (Bulletin, XXIII, 409). See also, Turcker, Robert W. 
The Just War: A Study in Contemporary American Doctrine. (The John Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 
1960) p. 15. 
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 More importantly, Nabati’s justification of pre-emptive strikes against 
terrorism based on the unrealistic nature of the UN Charter further needs careful 
evaluation in light of the requirements of modern democratic principles. It is 
undisputable fact that the urgency of self-defense requires prompt response by a 
state’s administrative executive head and its security agents. But that does not 
require a total dismissal of proposals by pressure groups and other non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) within the state. A true representative 
democratic state under normal circumstances will hesitate to initiate national pre-
emptive war strategies based on the views of a few individuals within the state. 
Issues of peace and justice affect all nationals – it pervades the executive, the 
judiciary, the legislature, and the entire civilian populations whose voices are 
usually expressed through the media, pressure groups, trade unions, and various 
religious bodies. And yet, prior to the inauguration of the “war on terror” any 
alternative views raised by these non-governmental organizations, social groups and 
peace activists were met with rebuffs. State authorities and officials overlooked 
such views. Implementing intervention policies in a western democratic state 
without national consensus runs at variance with good governance. Nonetheless, in 
his evaluation of the American Just War doctrine, Robert W. Tucker seems to 
notice clearly that the moral content of the American Just War principles does not 
make the doctrine generally accepted by the whole American citizenry. However, 
he presents a common feature of democracy - the constraints of achieving a 
consensus agreement - to counter the problem. Tucker writes: 
         To assume that there is a public doctrine respecting the justification for employing  
         force is one thing. To assume further that this doctrine reflects the “moral consensus”  
         of the nation as a whole is quite another matter. It is only to be expected that in  
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         addressing other nations the statesman will claim to speak in the name of a united 
         nation and will insist that his voice is indeed the authentic voice of the nation. At  
         best, this claim always contains an element of pretense, even for democratic societies.  
         Indeed, the element of pretense involved may be greater in the case of democratic 
         societies, since unity of view must normally be elicited and not imposed. Given  
         sufficient opportunity to exercise its critical faculties, and the will to do so, a         
         democratic society still rarely, if ever achieves the degree of unity of outlook in  
          confronting the external adversity that totalitarian societies not infrequently attain.76  
 
  Statesmen represent the populace and speak for the nation on several 
occasions but because contemporary terrorism greatly affects the ordinary citizens 
of a state rather than the direct organs of government, it is morally unworthy to 
ignore their opinion on many sensitive issues such as war.  If a civilized democratic 
state does not need to have moral endorsement at least by the majority of the people 
before implementing a decision determining the life and death of other human 
beings, then I think the legality and moral status of the doctrine is objectionable. It 
logically follows that such a democratic system of government is not worthy of 
being enforced or recommended for other independent states. Michael Walzer, an 
expert who offers a modern philosophy of the Just War doctrine, gives due 
recognition to the voice of the ordinary citizen in his remarks about international 
conflicts. Walzer writes: “But it ought to be possible for ordinary citizens to 
identify and focus on the central political and moral issues of a given intervention. 
To help them do that is the point of just war theory…”77 Because the reasons for 
contemporary war on terror are various, including the defense of human rights (in 
the case of Iraq) and invasion of the enemy’s political territory, Michael Walzer’s 
                                                 
76 Turcker, Robert W, The Just War: A Study in Contemporary American Doctrine. (The John 
Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1960) 5-6. 
 




point has to be taken seriously. Modern states must not therefore refuse to take into 
account different shades of opinion in responding to terrorism. Nabati’s paper also 
fails to consider this in deciding whether the “war on terror” is justified or not aside 
from its violation of the UN Charter on self-defense. 
 It can also be deduced from the article that Nabati’s argument for pre-
emptive strikes against terrorism is presented from the legal point of view, but the 
article’s defense of pre-emptive war on terror after the war had already been 
initiated by the U.S. and Britain renders his argument no more than those of the 
reasons enumerated in Chapter Three by some other writers such as Jean B. 
Elshtain. We do not intentionally flout the principles of international law and later 
appeal to the rigidity of the UN Charter as a justification. Doing so immediately 
distinguishes an explanation which is based on reasons from moral and legal 
justification. A close examination of the UN Charter even reveals that the argument 
that Article 51 does not allow states to defend themselves is objectionable. Article 
51 plainly grants all states the permission to defend themselves during an armed 
attack, period! To wage anticipatory self-defense war with the view that country X 
poses a threat to country Y has an inherent epistemic problem. One has to prove 
how and why a potential war criminal may be considered an actual war criminal 
before launching pre-emptive strikes. That isn’t enough though, for there is still the 
need to prove the legal and moral legitimacy of such war before the international 
community.   
 
 75
 The rationale behind the Charter’s regulation of self-defense wars requires 
investigation. My conviction is that article 51’s restriction on anticipatory self-
defense is a means of promoting peace and justice among all states and all people. I 
think human beings are rational animals (at least in most cases), who do not act if 
there is not a cause. Though terrorism is morally reprehensible, I would want to 
maintain that there seems to be an element of objectivity in terrorist thinking, 
functioning to determine within which geographical boundary they should strike 
and who is to be targeted by the terrorist as an enemy.  And so, when the UN 
Charter maintains that a state is permitted to defend itself during an armed attack, it 
presumes that no state will initiate direct or indirect oppression and abuse the rights 
of others. Under such conditions, no state will attack another and there will be 
chances of reasonable peace and tranquility among all people. But this appears 
impossible because of the belief in the inevitability of conflicts among the human 
race, given the differences in taste, preferences, self-interest etc. that usually 
characterize human action. If this belief is true then before an attack begins or after 
an attack, states ought to and can communicate their decision on pre-emptive self-
defense to the Security Council for an approval before any military action. The self-
defendant state shouldn’t find this injunction a burden at all if its international 
relations with other states have been morally consistent.   
 
Nabati’s position for pre-emptive use of force against terrorism is derived 
from the self-defense principle that all states are entitled to evoke when confronted 
by an undue threat. But his argument does not seem to acknowledge that the U.S.’s 
seemingly inconsistent national policies, injustices, and violations, which pose a 
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threat to the Arab world, partially explain the rampant suicide bombing against the 
U.S. and its allies. Some few remarks by scholars underscore this point. As `ad 
Abukhalil has described America’s relationship with the Arab world, it is a story 
involving: “murder, deception, duplicity, crude and subtle propaganda, war, defeat, 
racism, humiliation, oppression, misery, bigotry, and international domination and 
subjugation.”78 Dr. Shreesh Juyal, professor of Political Science and director of the 
Institute for the United Nations and International Affairs also draws a parallel 
between the September 11 attacks and U.S. human rights abuses when he wrote: “If 
terrorism means violence against innocent civilian and non-combatant targets, 
during the past decade, from Iraq to Sudan to Yugoslavia, the United States missiles 
have destroyed the lives of civilians just as innocent as those who perished on 
September 11.”79  In his analysis of civilian casualties caused by the U.S. since 
World War Two, Kai Nielsen also shows how history presents the U.S. as a typical 
terrorist state.80  
Given this background it is difficult to justify the pre-emptive use of force 
against the very acts of which the great nations are also guilty.  Isn’t Nabati’s 
argument trying to justify the unjustifiable by explaining pre-emptive war on terror 
on the grounds of international law’s unrealistic nature? Should terrorism be 
accepted because terrorists lack the military power to face great nations?  In 
                                                 
78 Abukhalil, A.  Bin Laden, Islam and America’s New “War on Terrorism”. (Seven Stories Press, 
New York, 2002) p.12 
 
 
79Juyal Shreesh, ‘International Law and Terrorism’ in The Saskatchewan Peace News (Vol.10 No. 1, 
February 2002) p.6. Also published in The Third Degree, The University of Regina Alumni 
Magazine, Fall 2001. 
80 Nielsen, K. ‘On Terrorism (State and Otherwise)’ A presentation given at the Western Canadian 
Philosophical Association Conference held in October 2002 at the University of Calgary, Canada. 
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Kantian parlance, there is a contradiction when Nabati’s justificatory theory of self-
defense is universalized, unless we grant that state terrorism is not terrorism proper.  
If a state is justified in using force against its adversaries without considering its 
own moral status then the so-called ‘rigid’ and ‘unrealistic’ international law 
requirement for pre-emptive self-defense would strongly justify Iraq in launching 
pre-emptive strikes against the United Kingdom and the U.S. prior to their invasion 
of Iraq since that threat was more imminent than the threats posed by the September 
11 attacks or the supposed weapons of mass destruction program pursued by Iraq. 
Further, if we grant that pre-emptive strikes against terrorism are justified without 
enough evidence of the terrorist intention and readiness to strike (as when the U.S. 
accused Iraq of possessing WMD), every state may strike any state anywhere and at 
any time when it senses danger. As a result, humankind will find themselves in a 
Hobbesian state of nature – “the war of all against all”, and at the end it is only the 
strong that can survive. Where lies the hope and security of the weak? How can the 
weak survive? This explains why scholars like Michael Ignatieff sometimes label 
contemporary terrorism as the “strength of the weak”81.  So it can be said that it is 
the will to survive and to legalize survival that has brought about the conflict 
between the weak states and the great nations. The truth of the matter is that great 
nations like the U.S. have appealed to international law to justify wars against many 
states including several interventions. So it appears the Arab world finds terrorism 
the only convenient means for self-defense in current politics.  
 
                                                 
81 Michael Ignatieff, “The Strength of the Weak: The Justification for Terrorism” in Political Ethics 
in an Age of Terrorism, a lecture given at the University of Edinburgh in January, 2003. 
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In sum, I think the language of the UN Charter on self-defense does not 
conclusively prevent states from defending themselves against an attack. 
International law still allows the victim state to defend itself against an ongoing 
aggression. In the case of potential attacks the UN Charter does not permit member 
states to act without the Security Council’s approval.  But as Nabati argues, it will 
be dangerous to grant that states should wait until an attack fully materialized 
before doing something about it. While Nabati’s point is important it is also not a 
guarantee that all pre-emptive strikes against potential threats will necessarily 
ensure peace and justice. The challenge then is to show how pre-emptive strikes 
against suspected terrorists will ensure peace and justice if such an exercise is taken 
by a state or a people guilty of a similar crime. This is what Chapter Five attempts 













CHAPTER FIVE: MORAL CONSISTENCY, A NEED FOR PRE-EMPTIVE 
STRIKES AGAINST TERRORISM 
  
 “To condemn war is easy; to overcome it is difficult”…………… Leon Trotsky, a 
Russian revolutionary 82
 
5.0: Introduction  
  Terrorism interrupts international peace and order; it threatens individual 
human rights, it claims precious lives of innocent civilians and may also lead to the 
collapse of established political regimes if uncontrolled. Without doubt, these are 
enough proof to justify the control of the phenomenon. So in order to ensure global 
peace and justice the horrendous acts of terrorism have to be stopped but only 
according to international standards of law and ethics of war. Since the “war on 
terror” adopts a national policy with military use of force which does not seem to 
conform to the traditional Just War theory or the generally agreed principles of 
international law, this chapter discusses the complexities involved in human rights 
protection and the significance of self-defense in an age of terror. Finally, given the 
heated debate on the issue of pre-emptive strikes against suspected terrorists, the 
chapter focuses on the Just War Pacifist ideology and recommends moral 
consistency as a condition for pre-emptive war against terrorism.  
 
5.1: Moral Consistency 
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Launching pre-emptive wars to confront terrorism without thereby 
committing a similar crime is necessary for international peace and justice. How to 
achieve this aim is one of the major concerns in this essay from the outset. Unless 
states endeavor to reflect moral concerns in their approaches to international 
conflicts the challenges of the “war on terror” will continue to be compounded.  
This is because in recent times, self-defendant states appear to be guilty of the very 
acts of human rights violations they seek to protect against. But it is unlikely that 
the insurmountable terrorist activities can be brought to a minimal level if strong 
nations do not desist from abusive use of military strikes against the suspected 
terrorists. There should be firm moral grounds for the legitimacy of violence against 
terror. It is for this reason that I propose ‘Moral Consistency’ as an antidote to 
remedy the problem. Moral Consistency (MC) is not a theory that can stand on its 
own. In other words, it is not an alternative to Just War theory or the UN Charter. 
As the name implies, it only proposes some neutral and reasonable responses to 
international disputes, especially, self-defense wars for the promotion of global 
peace and justice. Moral Consistency seeks to enjoin conflicting states to avoid 
threats, abuse of human rights, and violation of war conventions in their attitude 
towards other sovereign states when applying international law and the ethics of 
violence. That is to say, Moral Consistency recognizes the importance of 
international law and treaties and emphasizes the need for states to remain 
consistent with the requirements of such rules. Above all, in its application to self-
defense against terrorism, Moral Consistency provides a set of ideal conditions 
under which pre-emptive strikes against terrorism may be accepted to a certain 
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limit. By this, MC may be understood as an analytical framework that dissects the 
concepts of punishment, threats, human rights, and self-defense, which seem to be 
issues at the core of the “war on terror”.  
Though terrorism is a crime against humanity, I do not think military 
responses against sponsors and suspected terrorists are morally justified if two 
conditions prevail: (1) if the victim state is guilty of a similar crime, and (2) if the 
state’s pre-emptive use of force against terrorism contravenes the principles of 
international law. As has already been discussed, states cannot be discouraged from 
defending themselves against terrorism “during an attack” since it is their inherent 
right to do so. While self-defense during an attack is legitimate, the justification of 
anticipatory and pre-emptive strategies against terrorism remains highly 
controversial even though the latter may also be a form of self-defense. What role 
can moral consistency play to ensure peace and justice in the “war on terror”? The 
contribution of moral consistency in the ethics of pre-emptive strikes is evident in 
the principles upon which it is built. Moral consistency primarily builds on Just War 
Pacifist beliefs, a commitment to showing how modern day warfare cannot be 
called a just war. Nonetheless, MC is also concerned with how modern day warfare 
can be just though it seeks to reduce violence in international politics. By this it 
hopes to restore the image of traditional Just War theory. 
Moral consistency attempts to bridge the gap between absolute rejection of 
the use of force and excessive military strikes adopted by the “war on terror”. It 
does this by evaluating the concepts of punishment, threat, and self-defense. 
Another significant content of moral consistency is the recognition of and 
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compliance with, international law and order. Some scholars may oppose law 
abiding theories such as categorical imperatives. Some also think that a concept that 
shares close affinity with pacifist doctrine such as Moral Consistency absolutely 
rejects all forms of violence and the use of force. In the 2003 Whelen Lecture at the 
University of Saskatchewan, Michael Ignatieff’s rejection of perfectionism was 
based on an assumption that even though commitment to the principles of law is 
important it ought not always be the case since it may expose compatriots to the 
danger of terror and insecurity. Ignatieff declares:  
     ...absolute commitment to human rights might preclude any taking of life in response to  
      terrorist attacks and restrict our response to judicial pursuit of offenders through process  
      of law. Such adherence to absolute standards would achieve moral consistency at the  
     price of leaving us defenceless in the face of evil-doers. For security is also a human right.83  
 
Such an impression needs to be cleared up as we begin to paint the picture 
of morally consistent response to punishment. Undeniably, MC is a pro-pacifist 
theory but it does not completely reject violence and the use of force. With regard 
to self-defense against terrorism, what MC does is to probe into the legitimacy of 
pre-emptive strikes and to examine such strategy’s relationship with peace and 
justice. Being morally responsible in addressing the problem of combating 
terrorism with a reasonable amount of violence when there is no option is a 
significant factor in MC. The objections I have raised against the use of military 
force against terrorism should not be misconstrued as granting amnesty to criminals 
allowing them to go scot-free after being convicted. In spite of the emphasis on fair 
terms of social cooperation among states and individuals, I agree with J.S. Mill that 
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if an individual or group or a state does anything harmful to others in the course of 
exercising their freedom and liberty, there is a prima facie case for punishing that 
individual or the group.84  
An institution of punishment is one of the measures that can ensure 
compliance with the law in every democratic state. Punishment curtails some of a 
people’s freedom and rights, and because of its harmful nature one may agree that 
there is a sense in which punishment may be conceived of as evil. Michael Ignatieff 
for instance, describes punishment as “lesser evil” pursued by liberal democratic 
states to ensure better results.85 However, if we think of punishment only as evil 
then it will not be morally worthy for a society to take measures to punish its 
members even if we qualify such measures as “lesser evil”. Punishment in itself 
may not be evil though the way in which it is administered may be wrong.  MC 
acknowledges that punishment may bring good results in democratic societies and 
attempts to avoid the wrongful aspect of it. In this regard, punishment should not be 
perceived as evil when it is administered through the right judicial procedure and 
remains consistent with constitutional provisions. Further, the evil aspect of 
punishment is avoided as we consider who should be punished with what and when 
one should be punished and why. The rehabilitation theorists insist that wrongdoers 
have to be punished for the sake of moral reformation. Thus they consider the good 
effects which punishment may bring in terms of the improvement in the moral lives 
of perpetrators of criminal acts. Another aim of punishing offenders of the law is to 
deter future perpetrators from committing similar wrongdoings. On the other hand, 
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retributivist theorists argue that to punish an offender for deterrence or 
rehabilitation purposes is immoral. For the retributivist, punishing the offender is 
appropriate because justice requires that moral order be restored.  
The criminal’s wrongdoing interrupts the moral order of a society; hence, 
she ought to be punished so that the moral order and regularity would be restored. 
The element of justice in the retributivist theory—an effort to match the severity of 
punishment with the severity of the crime is significant in punishing an offender. 
However, since retributivism does not provide us with the distinction between the 
actual and potential terrorist there will be difficulty in applying retributivism to 
respond to terrorism considering the issues of who should be punished and why one 
should be punished though its emphasis on justice is necessary. Application of 
retributivism is irrelevant unless fundamental moral questions about who are the 
terrorists and why they should be punished are taken into account otherwise it will 
only be reduced to mere expression of revenge. 
  The overwhelming passion for indiscriminate punishing of terrorist groups 
echoes Jenny Teichman’s prediction that our willingness to punish terrorists will 
bring about a small war in the near future.86 However, the increased number of 
terrorist activities in spite of our persistent disciplining measures should not 
necessarily be attributed to the punishment we inflict on the actual terrorist groups. 
It is partly because the passion of anger and revenge lead us to include suspected, 
would-be terrorists and sometimes the innocent when inflicting punishment. When 
people suffer adversity and pain such as the September 11 attack, there is the 
feeling of hurt and humiliation. And as Trudy Govier has noted, it is natural for a 
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person to express displeasure and hit back in return when attacked.87 Most victims 
desire punishment not to serve justice but to get even. For others, punishment is 
used as an instrument to seek revenge or to derive some kind of satisfaction from 
hurting those who have wronged. It is the feeling of revenge that explains people’s 
call for “battlefield justice” or an “eye for an eye” kind of justice.  
For most people, vengeance is what they mean when they cry out for justice. 
Suspected terrorists might be punished in this context without achieving any 
reasonable success in international peace. Under the moral consistency strategy of 
dispute resolution, one may think of disciplining terrorists groups by focusing on 
the realization of three combined significant components – justice, moral order, and 
peace. Justice requires that a convicted terrorist be punished not only because he 
deserves it but also because punishing the actual terrorist has the aim of defending 
the rights of the innocent ones and to help them have their peace of mind in order to 
fulfill their civil rights and responsibilities. By doing so, the interruption of 
society’s moral order which the terrorist’s wrongdoing might have caused will be 
ameliorated. The ideas of peace and justice should always be taken into an account 
if we want to avoid the evil aspect of punishing terrorist groups. The absence of any 
of these key elements will not be an effective peace building strategy. Military force 
against suspected terrorist groups as a form of punishment may calm the rage of 
some of the people but it might not be successful for the purposes of peace building 
exercises among perpetrators and victims. Unilateral use of force against would-be 
terrorist groups without the support of the international community and especially 
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the UN Security Council is also a typical illegitimate form of punishment which 
does not seem to have any prospects of international peace and justice.  
 
Moral consistency’s response to punishing the culpable offender is justified on an 
assumption that such punishment springs from a legitimate source and that it is 
within the limits of the law– be it national or international. It has an element of 
retributive justice but its primary purpose is to seek peace, justice and moral order. 
For MC will not endorse punishing a terrorist who has not been convicted by the 
law since that is also an offense. This might seem deontological or absolute 
adherence to rules, but it has the potential of drawing a distinction between crime 
and criminal justice.   
 
5.2: Moral Consistency And Self-defense Against Threats  
Can we be morally consistent in responding to impending threats in an age 
of terror? I think we ought to, for without moral consistency it is almost impossible 
to draw a distinction between terrorist acts and self-defense against terrorism. The 
concept of self-defense is crucial in legal and political philosophy. States, 
individuals and groups do not want to be deprived of their autonomy and self-
determination. Thomas Hobbes was right in ascribing wars to man’s desire for 
power due to fear and insecurity. Without doubt, this is what sometimes underpins 
humans’ struggle for their political, social and economic interests. Human beings 
need to preserve their interests for it is their right not to be deprived. To defend 
oneself underscores the idea that one has some basic rights that she or he must not 
 87
be denied. Every human being is born with such basic rights some of which have 
been encoded in international law. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(1948) for instance, grants every individual the rights to life, liberty, and security; 
the right to own property, freedom of speech, freedom to form an association etc. 
The dangers, hindrances, impediments and forces intended to thwart a people’s 
appropriation of these rights whether by the state or an institution can be designated 
as threats especially if they are expressions of harm, hurt, injury and have the 
potential of causing destruction or damage to mankind, properties, and the 
environment. All such threats intended to interfere with the rights and freedoms of 
groups and individuals have to be reasonably defended against.  
Now the challenge facing modern states is not how one can identify their 
rights but how to react when threats against human rights renders a state defenseless 
and insecure. Some political scientists and international law experts admit that there 
seems to be no generally accepted means to resolving human rights abuses 
especially when oppression and suppression against humanity become intolerable. 
The struggle for political liberation in South Africa during the 1990s is usually cited 
as a typical example. The military and police of the government acted swiftly to 
repress several violent rebellious activities that were committed by the civilian 
population during the uprising against the apartheid policy but during the 
reconciliation process, while a sector of South Africans considered the military role 
to be legitimate, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission rather justified the 
people’s insurrections in light of international standards of unconventional wars. In 
her analysis of the moral principles of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 
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Mary Burton cites the exact verdict by the commission on the tension that arose 
between the two parties: “those who fought against the system of apartheid were 
clearly fighting for a just cause, and those who sought to uphold and sustain 
apartheid cannot be morally equated with those who sought to remove and oppose 
it”.88 In this context, torture, severe ill treatment, detention without trial, racism, 
killing, and abduction characterized by the apartheid policy were condemned as 
‘crimes against humanity’ whilst the civilians’ strike actions, rebellion and 
insurrections against the state were justified as a means for liberation from an 
oppressive rule. One may draw a parallel between the South African experience and 
the contemporary “war on terror”.  
Terrorism involving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is an example of 
supposed struggle for self-defense against America’s alleged suppression of some 
Middle Easterners both directly through invasion, and indirectly through support for 
the Israelis.89 And given the military power of the United States, it appears that 
terrorist groups cannot succeed in any way in defending their rights. This seems to 
be one of the reasons why they have strategically avoided a direct confrontation 
with the enemy’s military forces and have adopted deliberate, random targeting of 
civilian populations, and precious properties belonging to their enemy and her 
allies. That is to say, it is apparent that powerlessness of the weak, who cannot 
employ the legitimate use of force, compels isolated groups and individuals to 
resort to terror for self-determination and protection of their rights. Should one 
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justify terrorism in light of the South African example? There are two schools of 
thought regarding the ethics of self-defense through terrorist activities. 
 
The first school of thought condemns terrorism based on the civilian immunity 
principle under the Geneva Convention of 1977. According to this principle, certain 
groups of people such as children, women, prisoners of war etc. are to be protected 
in warfare. Terrorism is therefore condemned since perpetrators kills 
indiscriminately.  The second school of thought, however, evaluates terrorism from 
a human rights perspective. Those who perceive terrorism as self-defense war 
strategy contend that the terrorist’s indiscriminate killing is ethical because the law 
of human rights requires that we treat all human beings equally. For instance, 
Michael Ignatieff, a renowned Canadian writer and historian has recently conceded 
that since the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) rejects moral 
discrimination against a person it is very difficult to condemn the terrorist 
indiscriminate killing with regard to the human rights ethical framework because it 
will be wrong to kill a person based on status.90 Thus the use of force to pre-empt 
terrorism by the strong may be slightly different from terrorist atrocities in self-
defense if the former is undertaken within the ethical framework of the laws of war.  
As mentioned earlier, according to the standards and principles of the laws 
of war such as the Geneva Convention Protocol, non-combatants and prisoners of 
war must be protected from harm and torture. In this regard, self-defense war by the 
strong against terrorism may be ethically justified when the non-combatant 
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immunity is observed. So it is by observing the precepts of these rules that 
distinguishes the freedom fighter from a terrorist. But do states really observe and 
adhere to these laws of war during pre-emptive strikes?  I do not think so, for on 
many occasions combatants have failed to heed the jus in bello Convention and the 
ethics of war in both theory and practice. Since Chapter Two of this essay has 
already explored instances of modern states’ abuse and violations of the laws of 
war, let us now explore the relevance of MC by examining some of the factors to be 
taken into an account when responding to threats and self-defense.        
The moral concepts of right and wrong seem to be downplayed by the legal 
justification of self-defense. In other words, our notion of legal justification of pre-
emptive war against terrorism by and large creates an impression that we are 
morally right in defending ourselves. In some instances this may be correct, but I 
think others are morally wrong. Being morally consistent in legal and ethical 
matters is a prerequisite condition for waging a legitimate self-defense war. There 
are two senses in which the act of self-defense against a threat may not be morally 
right - first, if the threat was initially incited and unduly provoked by the self-
defendant; and second, when the rationale of the self-defense seems to demonstrate 
the defendant’s intention to suppress the power of his antagonist just because of the 
former’s military strength and superiority. While modern states allude to the rigid 
nature of international law to rationalize their unauthorized self-defense wars there 
is no point in repeating myself about the fact that they recognize the “chance of 
success” criterion of the Just War doctrine as a much more relevant principle than 
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the rest. Instead I will attempt an illustration to throw more light on instances where 
the use of force might not be morally consistent with the principles of self-defense.  
When a state first violates the rights of others it has no moral right to launch 
pre-emptive strategy in self-defense when being attacked unless it has taken 
measures to correct the injury which has already been caused.91 An alternative 
approach to the use of force is recommended even if the self-defendant possesses 
all it takes to succeed in self-defense. This is a significant aspect of moral 
consistency that should be taken into account if we care about the objections raised 
against the “war on terror”. With their interpretation of “last resort” in the 
traditional Just War doctrine, contemporary Just War theorists seem to have 
switched from a more fundamental moral justification of the use of force to new set 
of principles that do not take into account the moral circumstances of the self-
defendant into account when launching military campaign against a potential 
enemy. When waging pre-emptive self-defense wars against threats Just War 
Pacifist ideology should spell out clearly what cannot justify pre-emptive use of 
force, while moral consistency should tell us what must be expected before pre-
emptive strikes can be morally justified.  I am going to use state intervention in my 
illustration of the legitimacy and illegitimacy of self-defense against threats because 
I think the great nations’ rampant unacceptable interventions largely account for 
some versions of contemporary terrorism.   
When two states, say country X and Y, are at war for any reason, the 
generally accepted though not universally agreed norm is that it is the primary 
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responsibility of the international community like the UN Security Council or any 
other legitimate body recognized by both parties to intervene. This should be based 
on the principles of international law and treaties with respect to such an 
intervention. Without that any unilateral intervention by a third party, say country Z 
in support of country X against country Y is likely to result in serious moral 
consequences no matter how one may justify Z’s intervention. Country Z may be 
stronger than both countries X and Y and might even claim to have intervened on 
humanitarian grounds. Or country Z may even be a close ally to one of the opposing 
states say country X, but insofar as international law stipulates how international 
disputes should be resolved and the fact that international law recognizes the 
sovereignty of each state in the promotion of freedom, justice and peace in the 
world, country Z will not be morally consistent according to this principle in a bid 
to hit back or avenge when country Y attempts a self-defense. For the weak must 
survive as well as the strong.  
Great nations must note that their military strength and power should never 
prevent them from being attacked by the weak if the former is at fault. The meaning 
of a threat therefore can be interpreted as a function of the moral status of the 
claimant of self-defense. A group, a state, or an individual is morally, legally, and 
ethically justified in defending themselves against a threat of an enemy only if it has 
“clean hands” regarding such a potential threat. I am morally justified in defending 
myself against a murderer who threatens to take my life if I have not previously 
done anything that may warrant the murder or if I am innocent. Moreover, the 
legitimacy of self-defense depends on the moral circumstances of an attacker and 
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the self-defendant. Why is a thief who kills a security officer in an escape attempt 
guilty of murder? If armed robbers steal money from the Royal Bank of Canada to 
build mansions for the homeless in poor countries, the theft is still a criminal 
offence and must be dealt with according to the law. Assuming in the course of this 
robbery some security officers fired warning shots to help them capture the armed 
robbers, we will all be outraged to hear that the armed robbers would also be 
justified in shooting the security officers in the name of self-defense.  It seems to 
me that it is not warranted for us to respond to threats and attacks in any way 
possible. The causes of a potential danger have to be taken into an account. One 
may claim to be legally justified in defending themselves without being morally 
right for their actions. So to launch a pre-emptive strike against an enemy some 
conditions must me fulfilled.  
 
5.3: Moral Consistency Requirements for Pre-emptive Strikes 
No rational moral theory will endorse the horrendous acts of terrorism. 
Moral consistency does not purport to legitimate it either, for the logic of securing 
human rights protection and self-determination through suicide bombing is absurd 
both from political and religious points of view. That is why this essay attempts to 
set up an ethical guide, which determines when one is morally right in using force 
against an attack - for states in their response to terrorism so as to escape the danger 
of producing counter-terror. There would be no need to halt terrorism if the acts of 
terror were ethically accepted. By criticizing counter-terror, I am not advocating 
‘turn the other cheek’ or the extreme pacifist approach for conflict resolution. In 
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confronting terrorism, the moral consistency thinker should first know that terrorist 
groups adopt unethical means to achieve an end. Surely, a non-violent technique is 
highly recommended rather than any other approach to dispute resolution at the 
initial stage of conflicts. Alternatives don’t seem to be scarce when states are 
confronted with violent attacks but state authorities and antagonists have frequently 
employed military force as the only appropriate strategy in their circumstances. Part 
of the problem is that great nations may want to prove that they cannot be attacked 
with impunity. But if she fails to identify other alternatives, the moral consistency 
advocate would lose her moral status and becomes like the terrorists, especially 
when her basis of justification contravenes the most accepted ethical theories of 
war.  
The necessity of self-defense in the light of customary international law (as 
discussed in Chapter Four) makes the rejection of pre-emptive strikes against 
terrorism a contentious debate. Of course, it does not seem clear why states should 
hesitate to avert a possible danger that might claim precious human lives and 
properties if it has the means to do so. However, there should be a moral 
requirement that states and groups and individuals must satisfy before launching 
pre-emptive strikes. This is one of the conditions that can distinguish the moral 
consistency approach from the contemporary Just War theorist position. For while 
the contemporary Just War theorist may want to launch pre-emptive war once there 
seems to be reasonable chance of success, the moral consistency thinker will be 
much more concerned with the cause of such a potential danger; he will concern 
himself with the gap between the potential and the actual danger; and he will 
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objectively consider other alternatives before choosing the best internationally 
accepted approach for conflict prevention.  
 
It does not seem to make sense to demand that a state should wait until it is 
attacked by an enemy before defending itself. Hence pre-emptive war against an 
aggression may be permitted but only for the states that have ‘clean hands’ in order 
to promote peace and justice. The only pre-emptive war that can carry some moral 
weight is when sufficient evidence is provided for the enemy’s plans to inflict harm 
or danger on the innocent and when the defender has not previously violated the 
rights of the would-be attacker. If there have been previous wars and violations 
among two states and they have not resolved their differences it will be 
inappropriate to use anticipatory self-defense. All such wars may be categorized as 
continuous or intermittent wars.  
How much evidence is enough? This is an epistemic question and does not 
seem to have a definite answer. It is difficult to determine how much evidence is 
required before one can respond to a possible danger. Must I wait till an attacker’s 
knife is in my throat before being sure one is my enemy? Of course not. However, I 
think one should fear his enemy rather than the enemy’s weapon, for I will not 
suspect any one with a knife to be my enemy if there were no previous struggles 
between us. Human beings require peaceful co-existence in order to overcome the 
suspicion and mistrust of other people. Otherwise, not only will a weapon such as a 
knife possessed by someone expose him or her as my enemy; I will even begin to 
sense danger as soon as I discover that my potential enemy is in possession of steel. 
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I will however not be worried if I realize a person is amassing dangerous weapons 
of mass destruction once my conscience is clear. So one should be concerned about 
the degree of hatred, anger, animosity in their enemy’s ingrained culture and think 
of how these can be eradicated rather than targeting few specific groups of people 
and their weapons.   
Sympathizers of “battlefield justice” may disregard this proposal outright. 
They may do so but they are also required by MC to provide reasonable evidence 
for their belief that one is an enemy before launching pre-emptive war on terrorism. 
The self-defendant state must prove that its antagonist is ready to wage war before 
it can legitimately launch a pre-emptive strike. It is very difficult to know whether 
an intended atrocity by one’s enemy will be actualized.  But the Six-Day War of 
1967 between Israel and Egypt seems to typify the sufficient evidence condition. 
Though this is not enough to set a moral justification of the entire war, Israel 
seemed to have enough evidence to pre-empt the impending war to be waged 
against her given the steps that had already been taken. For according to sources, 
Egypt had advanced the following steps, which confirmed its readiness for a war. It 
is said that Egypt had: 
              announced a policy of hostility to Israel 
               put its military forces on maximum alert 
              expelled the UN Emergency force from the Sinai border 
              strengthened its forces on the border with Israel 
              announced the closure of the Straits of Tiran to Israeli ships 
              formed mutual support treaties with Iraq, Jordan and Syria92
 
While Israel’s evidence for preventive war is consistent with our 
epistemological requirement, the justification of the war itself is another subject 
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matter. As far as the justification of pre-emptive war is concerned moral 
consistency theory requires something more besides the sufficient evidence 
criterion. The pertinent question is why was Egypt not prepared to fight any other 
country but Israel? If both countries had been morally consistent in their dealings 
with each other there would not be any cause for the so-called pre-emptive strike. I 
doubt if attacks and counter-attacks by states may be referred to as pre-emptive war, 
for pre-emptive war connotes a war declared by an innocent state against a threat or 
an impending danger; such wars must be initiated by individuals, groups, and states 
with “clean hands”. America and some Arab countries have been in attacks and 
counter-attacks for decades. According to the moral consistency standards, all 
strikes since September 11, 2001, by America against her enemies including that of 
Afghanistan and Iraq do not genuinely typify pre-emptive strikes but a continuous 
or intermittent war or precisely, reprisals.   
In order to have ‘clean hands’ for pre-emptive attack, moral consistency 
urges that states look back into its history of international relations and foreign 
policies with other states for self-evaluation. By history, I am not urging that states 
should read their historic or pre-historic archives for what and how it has dealt with 
its antagonists for centuries. Under normal circumstances, state authorities will 
hardly declare war without a cause. The history I mention here therefore refers to 
events and incidents associated with the threat by one’s enemy.  As soon as country 
X boldly declares that it is at war with country Y, then country Y has enough 
grounds to avoid such possible confrontation. But moral consistency requires 
country Y to evaluate reasonably and objectively its relational factor toward country 
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X’s intended clash in a bid to avoid the war. Country Y will be morally justified to 
pre-empt the impending war but it is illegitimate to do so when country Y fails to 
adopt a reasonable pacifist approach; that is, if country Y allows itself to be 
animated by the pre-emptive war strategy without first considering a non-violent 
technique endorsed by international law. So in moral consistency, a pre-emptive 
strike is permitted only if it has the capacity to restore peace and justice without the 
tendency to produce retaliatory terror. For this to be workable the “backward 
looking” requirement has to be taken seriously.  
History plays enormous role in conflict analysis. The influence of a people’s 
past experience greatly affects their present and future actions against their enemies. 
This was underlined in Michael Walzer’s remark about Israel’s and Egypt’s war of 
1967: “Wars undoubtedly have long political and moral prehistories”93  Sometimes 
what one might call a threat or danger to another’s interest and security may best be 
described as a response, retaliation, and vengeance to previous injustices suffered 
by a people, a state, groups or individuals. As I mentioned earlier in this paper, the 
intermittent terrorist activities expose the resentment which perpetrators have 
harbored over the years. It will be difficult to promote peace without doing 
something about past injustices. But the problem is that we seem not to 
acknowledge easily the wrongs we inflict on others through international policies, 
interventions, and sometimes severe embargo and sanctions. Apparently, terrorists 
strike their enemies for a reason and whether such reasons are justified or not is not 
so easy to tell since our moral judgements sometimes depends on different value 
theories. Once again, terrorism is prima facie wrong but I doubt the legitimacy of 
                                                 
93 Walzer, M. (2000) Just and Unjust Wars. Third Edition. Basic books.  p.82 
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the great nations’ pre-emption exercises against it if they have systematically failed 
to treat the potential terrorist groups fairly. Therefore, to launch a pre-emptive war 
against terrorists, the reasonable pacifist has to look back at what has transpired in 
the past.  As ancient Roman generals practiced centuries ago, modern states must 
first explore nonviolent approaches to solve international disputes before 
considering the use of force if they really aim at restoring peace and order. But if all 
peaceful means fail then justice and fairness can take their course. Here, for country 
X to wage pre-emptive war against country Y with ‘clean hands’, in self-defense, 
country X should not have wronged country Y in the past since country X’s survival 
need not negate the rights and security of country Y.  
Neither shall country X wage unilateral pre-emptive war even when it has 
clean hands without going by the principles of international law on self-defense. 
Unilateral use of military action for pre-emptive war should not be encouraged not 
only because it contravenes international law on self-defense but also because it has 
the potential of inspiring future retaliatory terror. The tendency to label the self-
defendant state as an enemy is high. Hence, for prudential reasons, I propose pre-
emptive strikes should be waged under the auspices of legitimate group or a 
recognized organization such as the UN because it will not be easy for a people to 
wage a counter-attack against forty or fifty nations. Also, I think it is feasible for a 
collective body such as the UN to empower weaker nations to also embark on pre-
emptive strikes under morally justified conditions when their rights are unduly 
abused by great nations.   
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In sum, a pre-emptive strike against any potential threat (terrorism or 
otherwise) is a typical self-defense tactic. And since international law regulates how 
self-defense should be conducted, states are legally justified when pre-emptive 
strikes are launched according to those criteria. If modern states cannot go by these 
rules just because there are new challenges that render the international law on self-
defense unrealistic, then they should bear the moral consistency status before 
launching pre-emptive strikes. This is because, morally speaking, the unrealistic 
nature of international law for self-defense does not necessarily empower victim 
states to pursue their own unilateral approach for an international issue. Some 
powerful states may justify pre-emptive strikes against terrorism for such reasons 
and may even parade signs of success initially, but the realities in Palestine and Iraq 
reveal the very nature of preventing terrorism through the use of military force. My 
conviction is that we can minimize terrorism (at least those engineered by Islamic 
extremists) and its associated intermittent wars if powerful states will refrain from 
employing excessive counter-terror which does not seem to make any significant 
difference between criminal acts and criminal justice. Moral Consistency is not a 
panacea; it has just been offered as a supplement to international law and Just War 
theory to illuminate when a legitimate pre-emptive strike may ensure peace and 
justice for both the terrorist groups and self-defendant states.  
 
5.4: Conclusion 
I have examined how the great nations’ excessive use of violence in 
international politics has contributed to the widespread upsurge of terrorist groups. 
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To explore the justification of such military use of force, Chapter Two assessed the 
Just War Theory and various forms of pacifism. It can be said that there seems not 
to be much difficulty in applying the traditional Just War Theory to justify the use 
of force. However, due to the interpretation of some of the principles by 
contemporary Just War theorists, the legitimacy of military use of force to confront 
terrorism is contested. It is apparent that great nations’ pre-emptive strikes against 
terrorism do not take all the Just War principles seriously. For instance, the “war on 
terror” does not seem to have peace as its goal. Also, the “war on terror” initiates 
force not as the last resort as it was evident in an invasion of Iraq when UN 
inspectors of weapons of mass destruction were still conducting their search. It is 
for this reason that chapters three and four critically reject the attempted reasons for 
the justification of pre-emptive strikes against terrorism.  
But this is not an attempt to utterly reject any form of preventive war in an 
age of terror when violence has reached its peak in international politics. I am in 
search of an ideal conceptual framework that will discourage an excessive use of 
violence without leaving the innocent unprotected. Unconditional Pacifism is not a 
suitable doctrine at this stage because of its absolute rejection of the use of force; 
rather, I sympathize with Just War Pacifism. Just War Pacifism is implicitly 
concerned with how the justice and ethical issues in war can be achieved. It has 
pointed out some of the problems that distort the meaning of the Just War doctrine 
(see Chapter Two). But because it fails to propose how the problem can be 
mitigated, Moral Consistency has been recommended as a way that modern states 
which adopt the Just War Theory to justify the use of force should handle threats 
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against human rights in self-defense wars including pre-emptive strikes on 
terrorism. This does not seem to provide all the answers to the problem. 
Nevertheless, at this stage, the thesis demonstrates that pacifism is more than just an 
opposition to war; it is also a way of telling us why some forms of war are morally 
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